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INTRODUCTION
Former Vice President Dan Quayle's recent law review article rec-
ommends a major restructuring of the ground rules for pretrial dis-
covery in civil litigation.' Quayle formally unveiled his proposals
for discovery reform, as well as other significant reforms to the civil
litigation system,2 as part of the recommendations of the now-de-
funct President's Council on Competitiveness.3 The Vice President
contends that "pretrial discovery is frequently the source of need-
less delay and expense ' 4 and asserts that the discovery rules have
given attorneys too much discretion to control and abuse the pro-
cess by which facts and information are obtained and preserved in
1. See Dan Quayle, CivilJustice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 563-64, 568-69 (1992)
(presenting, as one component of overall program for reforming nation's civil justice system,
proposed limits for what is alleged to be "time-consuming, burdensome, and expensive pre-
trial discovery process").
2. Fifty specific changes have been recommended for the current civil litigation system
in the areas of voluntary dispute resolution, discovery, more effective trial procedures, expert
testimony, punitive damages, attorney's fees, improved use of federal judicial resources, en-
hanced incentives for encouraging meritorious litigation, reducing unnecessary burdens on
federal courts, and eliminating litigation resulting from poorly drafted legislation. PRESI-
DENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETrrIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 11-13(Aug. 1991) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSrICE REFORM]. A copy of the Council's report
is reproduced as an appendix to this volume of The American University Law Review.
3. Id.; see Quayle, supra note 1, at 559 (noting that some proposals were first unveiled in
May 1991 at annual Judicial Conference of Federal Circuit while full Agenda for Civil justice
Reform was later presented to organized bar at 1991 annual meeting of American Bar Associ-
ation).
President Bush created the President's Council on Competitiveness in March 1989 to foster
the prosperity and competitiveness of U.S. companies by providing a check on the issuance of
new regulations by federal agencies. See John W. Mashek, Suddenly, Quayle Becomes a Bully Pul-
pit, BOsTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1991, at 3 (noting role and influence of then-Vice President DanQuayle and Council on Competitiveness). On January 22, 1993, however, the newly elected
Clinton administration abolished the Council on Competitiveness in favor of a more open
regulatory review process. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing abolition of
Council on Competitiveness). The Council on Competitiveness labeled lawyers and the litiga-
tion process as a "major factor" contributing to the cited decline in competitiveness of the
United States in the international marketplace. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUsIcE REFORM, supra
note 2, at 1-3 (citing, as one indication of disadvantages facing U.S. corporations in world
markets, fact that foreign competitor product liability insurance costs are 20-30 times less
than U.S. costs). For instance, as former chair of the Council, Quayle asserted that the cur-
rent procedural system adds to "the unnecessarily high cost of litigation" and U.S. lack of
standing in the global marketplace by prolonging resolution of disputes and encouraging
wasteful litigation. Id. at 3. As an example, Quayle claimed that "as much as 80% of the cost
of litigation is in the discovery process." Id. One of the goals of Quayle's civil justice reform
proposals, therefore, is to reduce cost and delay and improve the standing of American indus-
try in the world marketplace by reforming the litigation process. See id. at 1-3 (suggesting that
costs of litigation have detrimental effect on U.S. economy and harm overall competitiveness
of U.S. companies in world markets); cf. Talbot D'Alemberte, Justicefor All, A Response to the
Vice-President, TRIAL, May 1992, at 55, 55-56 (responding to Quayle's charge "that U.S. lawyers
are responsible for a litigation explosion clogging the courts and sapping our competitive
strength" by arguing that lawyers are not part of competitiveness problem as alleged).
4. Quayle, supra note 1, at 563.
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connection with civil litigation.5 The former Vice President blames
the present discovery rules for causing delay in trials and imposing
excessive burdens and expenses on litigants. 6 Others have joined
the refrain. 7
In commenting on the proposals presented by the Council on
Competitiveness, former Vice President Quayle asserts in his article
that the reforms are merely procedural and are not intended to af-
fect substantive rights or bar meritorious claims; rather, they seek to
ensure and increase access to the courts so that people may vindi-
cate their rights.8 Much of this Article is devoted to testing the accu-
5. See Quayle, supra note 1, at 563 (characterizing taking of depositions, use of interrog-
atories, and document demands as "intrusive," "burdensome," and "onerous").
6. Quayle, supra note 1, at 563.
7. See, e.g., William Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be
More Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDicA-AURE 178, 178 (1991) (noting that one area of wide-
spread agreement is notion that discovery, as now practiced, "spawns some abuse and, more
importantly, is prone to overuse leading to expense and delay"). William Schwarzer is a dis-
trict court judge from San Francisco who presently heads the FederalJudicial Center in Wash-
ington, D.C. Id at 183. In Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay, Schwarzer reviews the
problems with discovery and possible alternatives and ultimately recommends "a system of
mandatory early and ongoing reciprocal disclosure, replacing all discovery other than what
the court specifically orders." Id at 178; see Terry Carter, Judge Schwarzer Goes to Washington,
CAL. LAW., Sept. 1991, at 21, 21 (commenting that "Schwarzer came to Washington with a
mandate to help streamline civil litigation" and that he transformed Federal Judicial Center
"into a bully pulpit" to promote "his own radical concept of discovery reform"). See generally
William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 703, 703-23 (1989) [hereinafter Schwarzer, The Federal Rules] (providing earlier eluci-
dation of Schwarzer's proposal for discovery reform).
The 1991 preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encompasses a similar
approach in proposing "a massive shift from discovery to disclosure." See infra note 31 and
accompanying text (providing relevant portion of proposed amendment to rule 26 that im-
poses duty of disclosure); Richard P. Holme, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules: The
Sirens of Revolution, 21 COLO. LAw. 923, 923 (1992) (reviewing August 1991 preliminary draft
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noting that litigators should "pay most heed" to
"revolutionary" proposals concerning discovery).
Substantial disagreement exists with respect to the scope and severity of the alleged discov-
ery "problem" as well as to the proposed solutions. See, e.g., Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating
Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 155-56 (1991)
(agreeing with notion that problem exists, but disagreeing that additional rulemaking ap-
proaches of Schwarzer and 1991 draft would cure "discovery ills"); Reagan W. Simpson, Sug-
gestionsfor Change: Discovery Reform, 55 Tax. B.J. 340, 342-44 (1992) (suggesting proposal for
discovery reform "that borrows from, and adds to, the current suggestions"). One article has
gone so far as to call for the abandonment of discovery. See Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 79, 79-81 (noting that because discovery has become "monstrous
nightmare," obvious solution is to follow lead of English and civil law systems, neither of
which employs discovery).
8. Quayle, supra note 1, at 560. The former Vice President stated:
It bears emphasis that these reforms are procedural in nature-directed at reforming
the process of resolving disputes. They are not intended to affect substantive rights.
Furthermore, none of the proposals by the Council is designed to close the court-
house doors to any meritorious claim or to any person. Instead, the proposals seek
to open those doors and create more doors for people to vindicate their rights by
clearing court dockets to hear truly meritorious claims.
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racy of these assertions as they pertain to the Council on
Competitiveness' recommendations relating to discovery.
The principal recommendations of the President's Council on
Competitiveness take aim at litigation brought by consumers against
those who may be liable for defective products. 9 The Council's pro-
posals, not coincidentally it is submitted, come at a time when a
well-organized general movement at both the federal and state
levels is calling for "tort reform."' 0 In its broadest sense, and as
portrayed in the Council's report and former Vice President
Quayle's article, the tort reform movement seeks a reexamination of
what its proponents believe to be an unfair burden imposed on
American industry by injured consumers.II With that in mind, it is
not surprising that most of the Council's proposals seek to limit or
impede, through the judicial process, a plaintiff's recovery in prod-
uct liability cases and as such are enthusiastically endorsed by the
9. See Quayle, supra note 1, at 561 (citing recent survey reporting that "potential liability
concerns caused 477% of U.S. manufacturers to withdraw products from the market, resulted
in 25% of U.S. manufacturers discontinuing some forms of product research, and prompted
approximately 15%o of U.S. companies to lay off workers as a direct result of product liability
experience").
10. See, e.g., Donald Harris, Tort Law Reform in the United States, 11 OxFORDJ. LEGAL STUD.
407, 407 (1991) (reviewing arguments in United States for reform of personal injury law);
George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 701, 702 (1992) (asserting
that "serious and systematic reform of modern tort law," characterized as" 'culture' of enter-
prise liability," is inevitable); Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 13, 14-15 (1988) (examining historical antecedents to present tort reform
movement and discussing possible tort reform goals).
11. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASS'N, ATRA PAMPHLET 1-3 (1992) (on file with The
American University Law Review) (detailing ATRA's efforts and activities in area of tort reform,
including need to address liability problems of members in present legal climate). ATRA's
mission statement provides:
ATRA's mission is to bring greater efficiency, fairness, and predictability to the
civil justice system through public education and the enactment of state legislation.
It accomplishes its mission in three ways:
By coordinating and supporting the activities of state legislative coalitions...
By keeping its members informed of tort-reform developments and mobilizing them for action.
By keeping public attention focused on the need for tort reform.
Id. at 1.
Another tort reform alliance is the Product Liability Alliance, a coalition representing more
than 300 trade associations and corporations, including manufacturers, nonmanufacturing
product sellers, and insurers, that actively seek enactment of federal product liability tort re-
form legislation. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY ALLIANCE, TPLA FACT SHEET 1 (1992); see E, PAT-
RICK McGUIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 1-35 (1988) (providing results of survey of
500 CEOs who assert that product liability litigation and substantial jury verdicts significantly
affect not only direct, indirect, and operating costs, but also future business plans). Among
some of the effects of product liability suits noted in this survey are the "pernicious" impact
on business planning and decisionmaking and the "major impact on the ability of U.S. firms
to remain competitive in world markets." Id. at 1, 3; see Gary Lee, Corporate Lobby Tries To
Create 'Big Mo'on Product Liability Bill, WASH. PosT,July 29, 1991, at A9 (noting efforts of major
corporations to escalate campaign to persuade Congress to pass new liability law that is more
protective of corporate interests).
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DIsCOVERY RULES
American Tort Reform Association. 12 Even though the 1992 presi-
dential election resulted in a change of administration and the aboli-
tion of the Council on Competitiveness,13 the proponents of tort
reform are unlikely to be deterred, and the issues will continue to be
the subject of debate and concern, especially in view of the enor-
mous effort invested and momentum already created.' 4
The purpose of this Article is to analyze and put into perspective
how the Council on Competitiveness' general recommendations re-
garding discovery relate to the overall goals of tort reform advo-
cates and to discuss whether those discovery proposals are
desirable. Part I of the Article examines the Council's specific rec-
ommendations regarding discovery. Part II briefly reviews the
evolution of discovery, reveals some of the reasons why the discov-
ery system developed as it did, and explains the functions served by
discovery. Part III questions who will win and who will lose by the
adoption of the Council's proposals concerning discovery. It exam-
ines the practical workings of the present discovery rules and specu-
lates about the likely impact on consumer litigation that adoption of
the Council's proposals will have. Part III will also attempt, through
analysis and example, to examine some specific uses and abuses of
discovery. This Article concludes that by restricting discovery and
thereby limiting information, the substantive rights of consumer liti-
gants are likely to be harmed in product liability cases.
12. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM Ass'N, STATE TORT REFORM OUTLOOK FOR 1992 1 (1992)
[hereinafter ATRA, OuTLOOK FOR 1992] (on file with The American University Law Review)
(praising 50 proposals in Agenda for Civil Justice Reform as helping to renew debate over tort
reform). As of January 1989, the General Membership and Steering Committee of ATRA
included hundreds of trade associations and corporations, including such representative orga-
nizations as Allstate Insurance, American Trucking Association, Chemical Manufacturers As-
sociation, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, Exxon Company, U.S.A., General Aviation
Manufacturers Association, Monsanto Chemical Company, National Association of Chain
Drug Stores, National Association of Manufacturers, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, Procter & Gamble Company, RJR/Nabisco, Inc., and Sporting Goods Manufacturing
Association. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASS'N, MEMBERSHIP LIST 1-5 (1989); see Statement by
the Vice President, Chairman of the Council on Competitiveness 1 (Nov. 30, 1989) (press
release) (on file with The American University Law Review) (noting that Council on Competitive-
ness "is working with groups from all sectors of our economy to reform our product liability
laws").
13. See Martin Tolchin, Settling In: Rewriting the Rules; Last-Minute Bush Proposals Rescinded,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at A10 (noting that spokeswoman for newly elected Vice President
Gore stated that "instead of the Council on Competitiveness, the new administration will
pursue a much more open process for reviewing regulations across the Government").
14. See supra notes 11-12 (reviewing membership and goals of groups advocating tort
reform); see also ATRA, OUTLOOK FOR 1992, supra note 12, at 1-40 (1992) (reviewing extensive
state-by-state tort reform initiatives).
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I. THE DISCOVERY REFORM PROPOSALS OF THE COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS
A. Background to Proposals
The Council on Competitiveness presented five proposals for
general reform of pretrial discovery procedures.' 5 These proposals
are discussed in general by the former Vice President in his recent
law review article. 16 Two additional proposals affecting discovery
concern motion practice and safeguards for trade secrets. I7
In his article, the former Vice President summarizes what he per-
ceives to be the governing deficiencies in the present discovery
rules. He asserts that the rules are flawed because "litigants have
virtually unlimited ability to take sworn depositions of witnesses, re-
quest documents, and submit written questions to parties."' 8 In ad-
dition, he states that litigants have "relatively free access to the most
private documents of their adversary" and the right to take deposi-
tions that "often last for several days and occasionally even
weeks."' 19 Quayle describes interrogatories as "potentially intrusive
and burdensome" and ultimately alleges that the "most onerous as-
pect of discovery.., is the document demand whereby litigants can
force the opposing party to open all of their filing cabinets to
inspection." 20
The Vice President makes the foregoing statements and urges the
adoption of the Council's reform proposals with little, or questiona-
ble, supportive empirical data, and also fails to make any attempt to
explain the rationale or history underlying the present rules of dis-
covery.21 Instead, he relies on a discourse based on anecdote and
15. See AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 16-18 (recommending that
new discovery rules require disclosure of "core information," adopt numerical limits on dis-
covery, provide that additional discovery be governed by market incentives, penalize abusive
discovery, encourage parties to admit facts not in dispute, and tie discovery requests to
pleadings).
16. See Quayle, supra note 1, at 563-64 (discussing alleged problems with present discov-
ery practices).
17. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 18-19.
18. Quayle, supra note 1, at 563.
19. Quayle, supra note l, at 563.
20. Quayle, supra note 1, at 563. Regarding discovery requests generally, the former
Vice President adds:
Although discovery requests are relatively inexpensive to make, the responding
party's costs can be staggering, involving the time of employees to produce materi-
als, attorney fees for review of materials to be produced, and the physical copying or
recording costs. Under the current federal rules, there are no limits to the number
of requests a party can make for discovery items as long as the requests are at least
tenuously related to the action.
21. See Marc Galanter, Public View of Lawyers: Quarter-Truths Abound, TRIAL, Apr. 1992, at
71, 73 (writing of Q uayle's characteristic mode of argument that "assertions are made about
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"quarter-truths. '22 In citing the breakup of American Telephone &
Telegraph (AT&T) as the only example justifying his array of dis-
covery reforms, the former Vice President commented that "in one
antitrust case .... the discovery stage lasted almost a decade; the
plaintiff's final pretrial statement was over 10,000 pages long and
cross-referenced approximately 250,000 pages of documents. ' 23 By
using such an illustration, the former Vice President has cited a case
that is virtually unparalleled in American litigation, involving com-
plex issues of antitrust law between two "Goliaths," the U.S. Gov-
complex matters without any sense of responsibility to some body of reliable information. It
seems to be assumed that in dealing with the legal system, fibs and fables are sufficient.").
22. Id. The Council on Competitiveness in the Agenda for Civil Justice Reform and the
former Vice President in his article place emphasis on the assertion that "individuals, busi-
nesses and governments spend more than $80 billion a year on direct litigation costs and
higher insurance premiums, and a total of up to $300 billion indirectly, including the cost of
efforts to avoid liability." AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 1; Quayle, supra
note 1, at 560. The source of this assertion is an article from Forbes in which the authors note
a book by Peter Huber that presents these figures and refers to them as a "tort tax" on the
economy. See Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Plaintiff Attorneys' Great Honey Rush,
FORBES, Oct. 4, 1989, at 197, 197-98 (presenting "tort tax" figures as partial evidence of
negative impact plaintiff attorneys are having on U.S. economy) (citing PETER W. HUBER, LIA-
BILrrv: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-5 (1988)). To arrive at his assess-
ment, Huber used a multiplier of 3.5, a figure that is based on an estimate that doctors spend
$3.50 for extra x rays and other defensive mechanisms for every dollar that they spend on
liability insurance. HUBER, supra, at 4. Some doubt exists regarding the accuracy of these
figures, however. See Carolyn Colwell, A Defense Lawyerfor Lawyers, NEWSDAY, Nov. 2, 1992, at
36 (presenting views of John P. Bracken, president of New York State Bar Association, who
calls figures "absolutely erroneous"). Professor Paul Weiler of Harvard University Law
School uncovered two analytical problems with the $80 billion figure relied on by the former
Vice President and the Council on Competitiveness. First, "'the medical multiplier shouldn't
be applied to nonmedical situations because the costs of defensive medicine make up a small
percentage of the total indirect costs of the liability system. The second problem is ... [the
assumption that] there are no gains from costs incurred to avoid liability.' " Id. (quoting Pro-
fessor Paul Weiler).
With its graphs depicting the increase in the number of American lawyers in "comparison"
to the number of lawyers in some other countries, the Council, without stating so explicitly,
implies a causal relationship between the number of American lawyers and the issues ad-
dressed in the report. See AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 2 (providing
graph depicting lawyers per 100,000 population forJapan, England and Wales, Germany, and
United States). The Council and the former Vice President are in tacit agreement in attribut-
ing significance to their proposals and the number of American lawyers. Even during his
nomination acceptance speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention, then-Vice Presi-
dent Quayle used the opportunity to charge that the United States has more than 707 of the
world's lawyers. Colwell, supra, at 36.
Professor Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin Law School has attacked the empiri-
cal support for this particular statistic as being a "quarter truth." See Marc Galanter, Pick a
Number, Any Number, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at-82, 82 (criticizing Vice President Quayle's asser-
tion that United States is home to 70% of world's lawyers as "overblown" and a "wild
guess"). Professor Galanter also found the Council on Competitiveness' statement that "the
legal system... now costs Americans an estimated $300 billion a year" to be a "product of
casual speculation." Id. With respect to these estimates and assertions, Galanter contends
that "there is an utterly cavalier treatment of facts, a use of sources that would shame any first-
year law student, and no attempt whatever to make a serious assessment of what is going on in
the world." Id.
23. Quayle, supra note 1, at 563. The Council on Competitiveness makes similar refer-
ence to the AT&T case in its report. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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ernment and AT&T. 24 It is clear, however, that the target of the
reforms is not large-scale business disputes such as the AT&T litiga-
tion, but personal injury lawsuits. 25 The paucity of supporting data
and the misplaced emphasis on a single aberrational antitrust case
between giants, together with the overall emphasis by the Council
on Competitiveness on product liability litigation between consum-
ers and corporate interests, should raise a question as to the true
motivation behind the suggested discovery "reforms. ' '21
24. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 642 F.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that Government charged AT&T with monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and
conspiring to monopolize markets for telecommunications services and equipment).
25. See Deborah Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitive-
ness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992) ("But at the heart of the Council
on Competitiveness's agenda are some notions that appear to be motivated by concerns that
go well beyond civil procedural reform. These proposals seek to change the current balance
between individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants, in favor of the latter."). Public Citi-
zen's Congress Watch contends:
Now President Bush and Vice President Quayle have taken on the corporate cru-
sade to limit liability, cleverly masking the same anti-consumer proposals within law-
yer-bashing rhetoric. The truth is that Bush and Quayle have nothing against
lawyers who rip off consumers and taxpayers.... Instead, when Bush and Quayle
bash lawyers, they confine their attack to the very system that allows ordinary con-
sumers who are injured by dangerous products to sue the corporations that care
more about profits than safety. This attack has nothing to do with competitiveness,
and everything to do with the corporate wish list to eliminate an important compo-
nent of health and safety protection: access to the courts.
PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE BUSH-QUAYLE PLAN To CURB ACCESS TO THE COURTS WILL HURT CON-
SUMERS AND INJURED VICTIMS, NOT LAWYERS 1 (1991) (on file with The American University Law
Review); see also Kenneth Jost, Tampering with Evidence, the Liability and Competitiveness Myth,
A.B.A.J., Apr. 1992, at 44, 49 (calling "competitiveness theme ... a defective product inanu-
factured by business groups to reduce costs for product-related injuries without really re-
forming the legal system"); Jerry J. Phillips, Attacks on the Legal System, Fallacy of 'Tort Reform'
Arguments, TRIAL, Feb. 1992, at 106, 109 (calling "alleged tort crisis ... pretext for an attack
on the civil jury system"); supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (noting importance of
product liability issues and involvement of U.S. industry in tort reform movement); see also
infra notes 135-78 and accompanying text (discussing winners and losers under Council's
recommendations).
26. The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not without supporters. Professor
Geoffrey Hazard of Yale Law School is reported as arguing:
"Modern products liability claims, toxic tort claims and environmental litigation
would be simply inconceivable without the combination of liberal pleading, liberal
joinder, and liberal discovery. The total effect of this development [the flexibility of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] has redounded to the benefit of 'have nots' relative
to 'haves.' "
Stephen N. Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 73
JUDICATURE 4, 6 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Fireworks] (emphasis added) (quoting Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, Yale Law School); see id. (reporting varying degrees of praise and criticism
for present federal rules).
This article also summarized federal district courtjudgeJack Weinstein's criticism of recent
attempts to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[T]he judge detected an anti-access movement, not in Congress, but in the federal
courts themselves. He saw two prongs to the attack: one seeks to close the doors
under "disingenuous guises" of "administrative efficiency" and "a purported 'litiga-
tion explosion.' " The other attack is on "the degree to which current federal prac-
tice resembles the Rules drafters' original plan." As to the first, Judge Weinstein
said, "statistical evidence indicates that we are no more overwhelmed now than at
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This Article concludes that the net effect of the discovery reform
proposals endorsed by the Council on Competitiveness, former Vice
President Quayle, and the proponents of tort reform will be to limit
discoverable information. The Article also recommends caution
before embarking on a course that will result in changing discovery
procedures where that course has not been validated by sufficient
and credible empirical data, and where the Council's proposals may
be driven by a hidden agenda favoring one class of litigants.27
B. The Council's Proposals Concerning Discovery
The remainder of this Part will focus on the specific proposals re-
lating to discovery that are presented by the Council on Competi-
tiveness. The Council's discovery proposals are discussed below.
1. Require disclosure of "core information"
The Council's recommendation requiring disclosure of core in-
formation28 is similar to draft amendments proposed by the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules and circulated for public comment
by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States.29 The Council report
and the draft proposal were both issued in August 1991. These pro-
many times in the past." The alleged litigation explosion "is a weapon of percep-
tion, not substance." In fact, federal judges "have maintained roughly the same
number of cases per judge as we had in 1960." Regardless, "[w]e are public servants
pledged to do justice, not exalted elites who bless the masses with such bites ofjudi-
cial time as we deign to dole out."
Id. (quoting Weinstein, J.).
27. See supra notes 11-12, 21-26 and accompanying text (reviewing notion of hidden
agenda and criticizing proffered empirical data); see also JULIUS B. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COM-
PARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 119
(1982) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court "has not been misguided by over-generalized allega-
tions of discovery abuse since 1970, just as it was not misled by the same allegations made
before it expanded discovery by promulgating the 1970 Amendments" to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure) (citation omitted); Milo Geyelin, Quayle's Data in Proposed Reform of Legal System
Called Misleading, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at B7 (noting criticisms of plan to overhaul civil
justice system as "based on skewed and misleading statistics").
28. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 16. The Council's recommenda-
tion states:
Parties should be required to disclose basic (or "core") information, such as the
names and addresses of people having knowledge likely to bear on the claims and
defenses and the location of documents most relevant to the case. This requirement
would obligate the parties to make disclosure on their own initiative. Should the
core information not be provided, the offending party would not be able to engage in
any additional discovery.
Id
29. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 3, 14-26 (1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-99 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS] (setting forth proposed rule 26 revisions that are
based on concept of disclosure rather than discovery).
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posals have in common the requirement that each litigant must initi-
ate disclosure of certain types of information without prior request.
The Council's proposal requires the disclosure of "basic" or "core"
information,3" while the draft proposal to amend rule 26 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure requires each party to initiate disclo-
sure, without prior request, of certain categories of information that
are likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense. 1 The draft
proposal to amend rule 26 precipitated a great deal of commentary
from the legal community, most of which was critical.32 As finally
approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States and trans-
mitted to the U.S. Supreme Court by memorandum dated Novem-
30. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 16.
31. 1991 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 29, at 87-88. The draft proposal to amend
rule 26(a)(1) provides in part:
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure
(a) Required Disclosures: Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except in actions exempted by local rule or when
otherwise ordered, each party shall, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to every other party:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have information that bears significantly on any claim
or defense, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all docu-
ments, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody,
or control of the party that are likely to bear significantly on any claim or
defense.
1991 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 29, at 14-15. The draft proposal to rule 26 further
provides for disclosure of information relating to damages claimed and insurance agreements.
Id at 15-16. See generally Federal Rules: Major Changes Sought by Judicial Conference Working Group,
60 U.S.L.W. 2158, 2158 (1991) [hereinafter Federal Rules: Major Changes Sought] (providing
brief summary ofjudicial conference's proposed changes for 20 rules and noting that "[m]ost
significant among the proposed changes is a broad overhaul of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and related
discovery provisions").
The draft proposal for rule 26 comports with the recommendations set forth in articles by
MagistrateJudge Wayne Brazil and Judge William Schwarzer. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adver-
sary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1349
(1978) (proposing that duty be imposed on both counsel and client "to disclose voluntarily,
and at all stages of trial preparation, all potentially relevant evidence and information");
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, supra note 7, at 721 (formulating new approach to discovery that
requires prompt disclosure of all material documents and information and permits "supple-
mental traditional discovery for good cause only"); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text
(detailingJudge Schwarzer's proposals on discovery and other reform alternatives).
32. See, e.g., Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Idea, Under Fire, Likely To Be Dropped by Panel, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 460 (Apr. 3, 1992) (noting that proposal to amend rule
26(a) "was criticized by an overwhelming majority of the nearly 200 individuals and organiza-
tions filing comments"); Federal Rule 26 Amendments: Wrong Medicine for Discovery Problems, 58
DEF. COUNS. J. 454, 455 (1991) (criticizing disclosure requirement as "likely to lead to
overdisclosure, increased discovery, new disputes regarding disclosure, more court involve-
ment in resolution of such disputes, and more delays, without any concomitant systematic
benefits"); Mengler, supra note 7, at 156-60 (reviewing proposed changes to federal rules and
noting number of areas of concern with initial disclosure provision); Richard C. Ferris II,
Note, Friend or Foe?-The Proposed Amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2
REGENT U. L. REV. 39, 41 (1992) (stating that "neither the proposed rule nor the existing rule
has been studied in sufficient detail to justify such 'radical' change to the nation's current
discovery practices").
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ber 27, 1992, 3 the proposed amendment to rule 26 retains the
requirement of initial disclosure without prior request. It requires
each party to provide certain information concerning "each individ-
ual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings" and information con-
cerning "documents, data compilations, and tangible things... that
are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings." 34
The recommendation from the Council on Competitiveness, on
the other hand, fails to define "core" information. The Council
uses language such as "likely to bear on the claims and defenses"
and "documents most relevant to the case." 35 This proposal is
33. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 72 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS] (trans-
mitting to Supreme Court proposed amendment to rule 26 of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, as recommended byJudicial Conference). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074, the Supreme
Court must "transmit to the Congress not later than May I ... a copy of the proposed rule...
[which] shall take effect no earlier than December 1" unless Congress provides otherwise. 28
U.S.C. § 2074 (Supp. 1 1989). This Article was written while these proposals were pending
before the Supreme Court.
34. The full text of rule 26(a), as recommended by theJudicial Conference, provides as
follows:
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure
(a) Required Disclosures: Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by
order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to
other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the
information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all docu-
ments, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or
control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the
documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from
disclosure, on which such computation is based, including materials bear-
ing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agree-
ment under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy part or all of ajudgment which may be entered in the action
or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be made
at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (0. A party
shall make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available
to it and is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully com-
pleted its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another
party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 72-74. In addition, rule 26(a)(2) pertains to
disclosure of expert testimony. Id. at 74.
35. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 16 (using language strikingly
similar to language in 1991 draft proposal).
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likely to cause disputes over the meaning of what must be volunta-
rily disclosed. Even under the more recent proposal of the Judicial
Conference requiring disclosure of witnesses with "discoverable in-
formation" and documents "relevant to disputed facts,"'3 6 disputes
regarding what must be disclosed will probably result. It is likely
that what may be subject to disclosure will create problems that are
associated with uncertainty or confusion, such as motions and other
actions seeking to verify or force compliance with the voluntary dis-
closure requirements.3 7
The various proposals leave to the party in possession of informa-
tion the obligation to determine what is "core," "significant,"
"bears significantly on any claim or defense," "discoverable," "rele-
vant," or "alleged with particularity in the pleadings," and what is
not. The use of a "vague and ill-defined term to control something
as important as discovery"38 leaves too much leeway for resisting
discovery, especially in the context of a culture that reportedly has
tended to resist discovery of information.3 9 As one commentator
has stated, "Dodging legitimate discovery should not be made eas-
ier by allowing such a fuzzy loophole." 40 That same commentator
36. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 73.
37. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofjustice, 40
AM. L. REV. 729, 738-39 (1906) (noting that at one point in history of lawsuits, much judicial
time was spent analyzing propriety of writs and pleadings under "sporting law" system of
common law and equity pleading). See generally CHrIrY ON PLEADING (London, 1st ed. 1809)
(providing forms for writs and pleadings); TIDD'S PRACTICE (London, 1st ed. 1790-1794) (pro-
viding comprehensive collection of contemporary writs and pleadings). Some battles never
end; they just move to a later stage of the lawsuit. Thus, one might say that the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 merely shifted the battle from the pleading stage
to the discovery stage. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYS-
TEM 11 (1968) (noting that discovery was intended not only to reduce trickery and surprise,
but also to produce more focused trial: "less irrelevant evidence would be introduced[,]...
fewer unnecessary witnesses would be called[,] ... [c]ertain issues could be eliminated from
the trial[,] ... [and] [b]ecause the testimony of parties and witnesses would be recorded at an
early stage in the litigation[,] ... testimony at trial would be marred by fewer fabrications").
One might hypothesize that adoption of a mandatory disclosure system would merely move
the battleground, together with its costs and delays, further down the line. See Ferris, supra
note 32, at 42 (stating that proposal "would cause an increase in motion practice, waste the
defendants' resources, and consume already scarce judicial resources"); see aho REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N WORKING GROUP ON CIVILJUSTICE SYS. PROPOSALS, ABA BLUEPRINT FOR
IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 69-70 (1992) (noting support for disclosure of core
information, but calling for refinement of recommendation, particularly in light of problems
associated with notice pleading system and definition of "core information").
38. Gerald R. Powell, The Docket Movers: A Critique of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, I J. AM. BOARD TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 14 (1991).
39. See Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 217, 219-51 (presenting perceptions, atti-
tudes, and ideas of sample group of Chicago litigators with respect to system of civil discovery
and its problems); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals To Amend
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 191 (1992) (noting that discovery
abuse is merely rational, deliberate, economically motivated behavior, and that efforts to elim-
inate such behavior must focus on incentives that lead lawyers to engage in it).
40. Powell, supra note 38, at 15.
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thought "naive" the suggestion that lawyers will comply with auto-
matic disclosure requirements because they are officers of the
court.4 1 The lawyer's ethical duty to the client to provide "zealous
representation" 42 or to act "with reasonable diligence" 43 may create
a dilemma or give added reason to avoid discovery insofar as the
lawyer may be obligated to determine what is, or is not, core
information. 44
Another criticism of such a "self-executing" 45 system of discovery
is that lawyers may be inclined to produce long lists of irrelevant
information in hope of "burying important witnesses in the midst of
a voluminous list of people with slight knowledge." 46
2. Presumptive numerical limits on discovery, with additional discovery
governed by market incentives
Presently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not limit the
number or frequency of depositions or interrogatories but do pro-
vide a mechanism by which courts may impose such limitations for
specified reasons.47 Once again, the recommendation of the Coun-
cil on Competitiveness 48 has similarities to theJudicial Conference's
proposed amendments to the discovery rules. Under the proposed
amendment to rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiffs, defendants, or third-party defendants are limited to ten
41. Powell, supra note 38, at 14.
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1980).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983).
44. See Ferris, supra note 32, at 56-57 (discussing probable attorney-client conflicts that
may result from proposed rule 26).
45. Federal Rules: Major Changes Sought, supra note 31, at 2158.
46. Powell, supra note 38, at 14.
47. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision
(a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discov-
ery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' re-
sources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act
upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivi-
sion (c).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (setting forth provision relating to pro-
tective orders).
48. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 17. Recommendation 7-8 states:
After the disclosure of core information, discovery should be conducted within pre-
sumptive quantitative limits and a market-based framework. The parties would be
required to formulate a discovery plan within predetermined numerical limits. The
parties would then be entitled to conduct any additional discovery, provided that
each party would pay the opponent's 'production' costs. Judges would be permitted
to change the pre-set limits and review costs for good cause.
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depositions without leave of court or stipulation. 49 In addition, the
Judicial Conference's proposed amendment to rule 33 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure limits the number of interrogatories to
twenty-five without leave of court or stipulation.50 The Council's
recommendation states that after the exchange of core information,
"the parties would meet to formulate a plan that would limit and
direct discovery efforts within preset limits." 51
It is unclear whether these preset limits are expected to be similar
to those in the Judicial Conference's proposed amendments to the
federal rules. Both the Council and the Judicial Conference favor
initial limitations on discovery, regarding both frequency and
number, with additional discovery available only upon stipulation or
for cause, 52 whereas the present system provides no such limitations
unless imposed for cause.55 The net effect of both proposals is to
limit the ability to obtain information by discovery. These numeri-
cal limitations have been justified on the basis that there is less need
for these devices in view of the provisions for initial mandatory dis-
closure. 54 This tradeoff is thus dependent on how well voluntary
disclosure will work in practice, a premise already questioned by this
Article.55
The Council apparently would allow discovery beyond the preset
49. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 114-27. Under the 1992 proposed
rule 26(b)(2), discovery in excess of the preset limits may be granted by the court if certain
factors are found to exist. Id at 79-80. Some of these factors include "the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues." Id. at 80.
Omitted from the 1992Judicial Conference proposal is the recommendation contained in the
August 1991 draft proposal that each deposition be limited to six hours. 1991 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS, supra note 29, at 38-39 (proposed rule 30(d)(1)).
50. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 138; see supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text (noting Council on Competitiveness' proposed standard under which additional in-
terrogatories may be propounded). The Judicial Conference's August 1991 draft proposal
contained a limitation of 15 interrogatories. 1991 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 29, at
49 (proposed rule 33(a)).
51. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 17. The Judicial Conference
proposes a similar conference between the parties. See 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra
note 33, at 85-86, 88-91 (providing that discovery may not commence until parties meet as
stipulated in rule 26(0).
52. See 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 114-27, 138-41 (proposed rules
30 and 33) (limiting parties to 10 depositions and 25 interrogatories without leave of court or
stipulation); supra note 48 and accompanying text (outlining Council recommendation 7-8,
which provides for presumptive numerical limits on discovery with additional discovery gov-
erned by market incentives); supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting when additional
discovery beyond preset limits may be undertaken under 1992 proposed rule 26(b)(2)).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
54. For example, the committee notes to thejudicial Conference's proposed rule 33(a)
state: "Revision of this subdivision limits interrogatory practice. Because Rule 26(a)(I)-(3)
requires disclosure of much of the information previously obtained by this form of discovery,
there should be less occasion to use it." 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 141.
55. See supra notes 32, 37 and accompanying text (discussing potential problems associ-
ated with mandatory disclosure).
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limits for depositions and interrogatories, but only where the party
seeking discovery agrees to pay the costs that the other party incurs
due to the additional discovery. 56 The Judicial Conference's propo-
sal contains no such burden when a motion for additional deposi-
tions or interrogatories is allowed. 57 Additionally, the Judicial
Conference proposes no new limitations on document requests
under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58 For its part,
it appears that the Council on Competitiveness proposes that costs
of document productions after initial disclosure be borne by the re-
questing party.59 The additional disadvantage to a consumer liti-
gant in this regard should be obvious. The Council's "pay as you
discover" approach gives the advantage to the party most able to
bear the cost and at the same time imposes the burden on the party
needing information. It should not be difficult to predict that the
party most disadvantaged by such a rule will be the consumer-plain-
tiff rather than the corporate defendant in a product liability case.
It is also a mistake to conclude that these changes will serve the
goal of economizing judicial resources and reducing expenses to the
litigants. The effectiveness of such rules ultimately must turn on the
ability of trial judges to manage cases and determine when it is ap-
propriate to allow discovery in excess of the preset limits. 60
3. Penalize abusive discovery
Presently, rules 26(c) and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provide the basis for protecting against and penalizing abuses
of discovery, including overzealous use of discovery and noncompli-
ance with and attempts to thwart discovery requests. 61 The rules
56. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 17. The Council's recommenda-
tion and explanatory text, although not free of ambiguity, state that without judicial interven-
tion, additional discovery may be pursued only upon payment of the opponent's costs. See
supra note 48 (providing text of recommendation 7-8).
57. See supra note 49 (discussing factors court may use to extend discovery beyond pres-
ent limits of 1992 proposed rule 26(b)(2)).
58. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 85-86, 88-91 (proposing that docu-
ment requests under rule 34 should not be permitted until after mandatory disclosure and
specified conferences).
59. See AGENDA FOR CIvILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that parties would
"be entitled to conduct any additional discovery, provided that each party ... pay the oppo-
nent's 'production' costs").
60. See THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 50-57 (1989), reprinted in The CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990 and theJudicial Improvements
Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
157-64 (1990) (providing survey of federal trial judges and various segments of federal litigat-
ing bar and noting strong support for increasing role of federal judges as active case manag-
ers as part of any procedural improvement of possible reform).
61. Current rule 26(c) provides in part:
[T]he court ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
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clearly provide sufficient sanctions for abuse, but they must be uti-
lized to be effective. 62
4. Encourage parties to admit facts not in dispute
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as cognate
state rules, already encourage admissions of facts not in dispute. 5
The use of rule 36 provides all the necessary tools to accomplish
this laudable goal. Without further explanation by the Council on
Competitiveness, its recommendation to encourage admissions 4 is
redundant and otherwise meaningless. Why the Council believes
that a party would seek discovery of an admitted fact is not clear. If
including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that
the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions ... ; (3) that the
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the
party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition
after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be dis-
closed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Similarly, current rule 37 provides parties with, among other things, means to compel dis-
closure or discovery by moving "for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an
order compelling inspection in accordance with [such] a request," when the opposing party
has failed to so comply. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). If such a motion is granted, the "party or
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion" will be required by the court to pay the
"reasonable expenses incurred" by the party obtaining the order. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
62. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (providing that sanctions for abuse of discovery may in-
clude assessment of costs and expenses, prohibitions against introduction of evidence, con-
tempt citations, dismissal, or default). A 1983 Advisory Committee note with regard to
amendments to rule 26(b)(1) noted that, on the whole, federal judges have been "reluctant to
limit the use of discovery devices." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committees' note: see C.
RONALD ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCrIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE 96-101 (1978) (presenting,
in part, 1978 survey of federal judges that documents that "many judges do not in fact grant
sanctions except for flagrant abuses"); Brazil, supra note 39, at 245 (reporting that judges are
generally unwilling to resolve discovery disputes).
Recommendation 9 of the Agenda for Civil Justice Reform states:
Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to establish clear standards for impos-
ing sanctions upon attorneys who abuse the system. The party whose conduct neces-
sitated the discovery motion would bear the burden of establishing that its position
was substantially justified. Sanctions would be automatic in instances where the
court finds an unreasonable, vexatious, or abusive discovery practice.
AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTCE REFORM, supra note 2, at 17.
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (providing pleading process whereby parties may request ad-
missions of fact for pending action only); see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.370 (allowing parties to
request admissions); ILL. R. Civ. P. 216 (permitting service of request for admissions of truth
or fact); MINN. R. Civ. P. 36.01-.02 (establishing procedure for requests of admissions of
truth); PA. R. Civ. P. 4014 (providing for requests for admissions); TEx. R. Civ. P. 169 (per-
mitting parties to request admissions of truth or fact).
64. See AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 18 (setting forth recommen-
dation 10, which states: "After a party has admitted factual information, further discovery
should not automatically be allowed. The court should have authority, where appropriate, to
prevent further inquiry regarding the area admitted.").
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indeed that were to occur, appropriate remedies to prevent abusive
discovery already exist.65
5. Tie discovery requests to the pleadings
The Council's proposal to tie discovery requests to the plead-
ings66 will create problems rather than solve them because the at-
tention of lawyers and judges will likely be deflected from the
modern use of broad and liberal notice pleading under the federal
rules to the archaic and discredited search for the "supposedly exact
pleading" to determine what is discoverable. 67 It is difficult to imag-
ine what rationale could support this recommendation. The propo-
sal will inevitably result in a purposeless return to an arcane,
outmoded, and thoroughly discredited system of pleading, a system
that the 1938 adoption of the federal rules was designed to
change.68 If nothing else, this recommendation demonstrates a lack
of appreciation for the historical and present realities of litigation
practice. Its apparent aim is to limit access to information unless a
litigant is willing to prepare a complex and lengthy pleading. This
result may create a "catch-22" violation of rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 69
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (providing for protective orders "to protect a party or per-
son from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense"); id. 37(c)
(providing remedy of payment of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees to moving party
where opposing party improperly fails to admit matter under rule 36).
66. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 18 (setting forth recommen-
dation 11, which states: "In making discovery requests, the parties should be compelled to
supply the rationale for the discovery by referring to the portion of the complaint, answer or
other relevant pleading to be addressed in the desired discovery.").
67. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Benjamin Kaplan, a preeminent com-
mentator on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, described the underlying philosophy of the
notice pleading provisions of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which track the
federal rules, as follows: "We would be loath to renew the futile paper chase for the suppos-
edly exact pleading, and shall resist any tendency to interpret the new [Massachusetts] Rules
contrary to their purpose and spirit." Charbonnier v. Amico, 324 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Mass.
1975); see FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (requiring that pleadings generally be "simple, concise and
direct").
68. See infra notes 96-121 and accompanying text (reviewing discovery rules and policy
goals behind implementation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938). See generally JACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 237-38 (1985) (discussing various reasons
necessitating simplification of pleading process); Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D.
456, 456, 469-72 (1942) (advocating civil procedure reform by means of added simplicity and
flexibility in pleading).
69. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party [to a pleading, motion, or other paper] consti-
tutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
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The recommendation will also give the party against whom dis-
covery is sought the opportunity to avoid discovery by claiming that
the pleading fails to disclose the rationale for the discovery. 70 This
proposal, combined with the Council's other proposed limitations, 71
almost guarantees that information will be more difficult to obtain.
To the extent that it will result in disputes over pleadings and fre-
quent motions to amend pleadings, the cost to the litigants will be
increased and more judicial time expended.72
The Judicial Conference's proposal to amend rule 26 also "ties"
discovery to the pleadings, 73 but in a fashion that is far more limited
than the Council on Competitiveness' proposal. The Judicial Con-
ference's proposal is limited to the initial mandatory disclosure re-
quirements; it is inapplicable to subsequent discovery procedures. 74
The Council on Competitiveness, on the other hand, would "tie" all
discovery to the pleadings. 7" The limited nature of the Judicial
Conference's proposal will present fewer problems than the Coun-
cil's wide-reaching proposal. Nevertheless, a rule departing from
notice pleading and renewing reliance on factual allegations, even in
this limited context, is a step in the wrong direction.
6. Other reforms
In addition to the five recommendations discussed above, the
Council on Competitiveness proposed two reforms to govern mo-
tion practice with regard to discovery disputes. First, the Council
requires parties to consult before seeking court intervention in dis-
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. A cynic might be inclined to conclude that prior to obtaining information,
one must possess it.
70. See AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 18 (recommending require-
ment that discovery requests supply underlying purpose by tying request to relevant
pleading).
71. See supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text (presenting and criticizing Council's
proposed rule that requires disclosure of core information).
72. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL JUsTICE SYs. PROPOSALS, ABA
BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 72 (1992) (opposing proposal to tie
discovery requests to pleadings and characterizing proposal as "unnecessary and counter-
productive" and likely to increase litigation costs); see supra note 37 and accompanying text
(discussing how disputes surrounding pleadings often have occupied judicial resources).
73. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (presenting and discussing judicial Confer-
ence's 1992 proposed amendment to rule 26).
74. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 72.
75. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (evaluating Council's proposal tying
discovery requests to pleadings).
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covery disputes, 76 and second, it invokes a "loser pays" rule for dis-
covery motions. 7 As indicated by the Council, the first reform is
already in place in many courts78 and conserves judicial resources by
recognizing that parties may settle their own disputes if required to
consult with each other. Thus, the first proposal offers nothing new.
As for the proposed "loser pays" rule for discovery motions, rule
37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presently provides
that courts should award reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, to prevailing parties who bring or oppose motions to compel
discovery.7 9 Only if a court finds that the making of or opposition to
a motion was "substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust" should it refrain from awarding
expenses.8 0 The current system recognizes that there may be legiti-
mate room to disagree and does not penalize counsel for taking a
76. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 18 (setting forth recommen-
dation 12, which states: "Before requesting that the court resolve a discovery dispute, coun-
sel should be required to certify that they have conferred with their opponent and, despite
good faith negotiations, are unable to agree upon a resolution.").
77. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 19 (setting forth recommen-
dation 13, which states: "When the court decides a discovery motion, the losing party would
pay to the winner the costs and attorney fees to vindicate the prevailing position. As with the
other "loser pays" provisions, this cost and fee shifting could be limited by judicial discretion
where appropriate.").
78. See, e.g., ARIZ. UNIF. R. PRAc. IV(g) (providing that discovery motions will not be
considered unless accompanied by certification stating that "after personal consultation and
good faith efforts to do so, counsel have been unable to satisfactorily resolve the matter");
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 37(e) (requiring that motions for discovery sanctions include certification
by moving party detailing attempts to reach agreement on subject of discovery-related mo-
tion); MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 9C (stating that "[c]ounsel for each of the parties shall confer in
advance of filing any motion under MASS. R. Civ. P. 37 [discovery sanctions] in a good faith
effort to narrow areas of disagreement to the fullest possible extent").
The Judicial Conference proposal also would require the parties to confer with each other
prior to application to the court for resolution of disputes regarding disclosure or discovery.
1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 148-50 (proposed rule 30(a)(2)(A)-(B)).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
80. led Rule 37(a)(4) provides as follows:
Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity
for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or
the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving
party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's
fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justi-
fied or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the
moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party
or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing
the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the
motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of ex-
penses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may apportion the
reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and per-
sons in a just manner.
Id. TheJudicial Conference's proposal retains the text of present rule 37 regarding an award
of costs. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 150-52 (proposed rule 37(a)(4)(A)-
(B)).
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justifiable position in court.8 1 If the Council's proposal was in-
tended simply as a restatement of current rule 37(a)(4), it adds
nothing to the dialogue.
In the summary following the recommendation, however, the
Council states that "[f]ee-shifting for discovery motions will be an
added incentive for the parties to limit unnecessary discovery and
should help discourage abusive discovery practices.18 2 This ap-
proach is a request for more frequent imposition of sanctions than
presently exists under rule 37(a)(4), although the test that the Coun-
cil would have the court use to impose sanctions is largely unde-
fined, and neither the Council nor the former Vice President cites
any empirical data indicating a need for added sanctions.83 In con-
sumer litigation, the financial burden of added sanctions would
clearly fall on the party most vulnerable to the sanctions' effect,
namely the individual plaintiff rather than the corporate defendant.
Additionally, neither the Council nor the former Vice President
presents any data as to the likely chilling effect that this proposal
may have on "zealous" or "diligent" advocacy, a standard required
by disciplinary codes.8 4 To the extent that the Council's proposal
inhibits the use of motions to compel discovery or motions for addi-
tional discovery, it will have the inevitable effect of limiting the avail-
ability of information.
An additional Council on Competitiveness proposal seeks to
maintain safeguards for trade secrets. The Council recommends
that "[c]ourts should retain the ability to preserve confidential and
trade secret information. These safeguards should not be eroded by
legislative action or rules changes."8 5 Presently, rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, to protect trade secrets by preventing their discovery or
forbidding their dissemination. 86 The Council's position is consis-
81. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (allowing for "substantially justified" opposition to dis-
covery without penalty).
82. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis added).
83. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting Council's lack of empirical data).
84. See supra notes 42-43 (noting ethical duties imposed on lawyers by professional codes
of conduct). One may also quite reasonably ask what incentive a plaintiff's lawyer working
under a contingency fee agreement would have for expending time and resources in order to
engage in unnecessary discovery tactics.
85. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 19.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) provides in part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending•... may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
... (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; ....
[Vol. 42:1465
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tent with a product manufacturers' movement seeking to preserve
trial courts' unlimited discretion to issue protective orders designed
to forbid the disclosure of information to the public or the sharing
of that information with other consumers injured by the same defec-
tive product.8 7 The use of protective orders is a common technique
employed by product manufacturers in settlement agreements to
prevent helpful material obtained in discovery from being shared
with the public or with other injured persons.88
Legislative proposals have been introduced in several states to
limit this type of enforced silence.8 9 Generally, these proposals,
while recognizing the need to preserve legitimate trade secrets, seek
to establish guidelines limiting protective orders where an overrid-
ing public interest is involved. 90 In addition, proponents of such
reform contend that secrecy orders are realistically intended to pre-
vent consumers injured by the same product from obtaining useful
Id.; cf. Protective Orders: BNA's 50-State Survey, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at
33-39 (Nov. 27, 1992) [hereinafter BNA Survey] (listing state rules and laws governing protec-
tive order use in all 50 states and describing pending reform activity).
The Judicial Conference recommends the substitution of the term "reveal" in place of the
term "disclose." 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 85 (proposed rule 26(c)(7)).
The corresponding committee notes are silent regarding this change. A likely interpretation
for the substituted language is that the term "disclose" has become a term of art under pro-
posed rule 26(a) that refers to "initial disclosures," and to avoid misinterpretation, the draft-
ers merely selected a synonym in order to ensure that the meaning of the former rule is
retained.
87. See BNA Survey, supra note 86, at 3-6 (noting intense opposition by business commu-
nity and defense bar to various state proposals to limit protective order use).
88. See generally 2A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY
§ 19.06[3][a], at 19-112 (1992) (noting that some parties condition settlement on keeping
discovery materials confidential); see also infra note 93 (noting that Dow Coming has utilized
secrecy orders in product liability litigation). The mechanisms regarding the issuance of pro-
tective orders usually involve what has been described as "settle and seal" agreements, which
are formed when the product manufacturer agrees to settle on condition that the injured
consumer agrees to a court order preventing disclosure of information obtained through dis-
covery. BNA Survey, supra note 86, at 43.
89. See, e.g., Margaret C. Fisk, The Reform Juggernaut Slows Down, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1992,
at 1, 1 (noting efforts in some states to pass legislation limiting use of secrecy orders);John H.
Kennedy, Secrecy Orders Put New Burdens on Legal Systems, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1992, at 53
(reporting that more than 20 states have considered imposing laws restricting secrecy orders);
Gina Kolata, Secrecy Orders in Lawsuits Prompt States' Efforts To Restrict Their Use, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 1992, at D10 (noting that California, Florida, New York, and Texas are working on insti-
tuting laws restricting secrecy order utilization); see also Russ M. Herman, Secrecy, Discovery
Abuse Breed Unethical Conduct, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 18, 19-21 (noting ABA and congres-
sional failure to adequately address problems that arise through use of secrecy orders in prod-
uct liability litigation). Such "sunshine" provisions restricting protective order use recently
have been adopted by court rule in Texas, TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a, 166b(5), and by statute in
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 69.081 (Harrison 1992). See generally BNA Survey, supra note 86, at
33-39 (listing current reform activities in each state).
90. See BNA Survey, supra note 86, at 43 (noting that California legislature, for example,
has sought to balance private business need for protective orders against public freedom of
information concerns).
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information rather than to safeguard legitimate trade secrets. 9' The
advocates of protective orders contend that there is insufficient evi-
dence of a need for change and that restrictions will not only create
a threat to privacy, but will also be a disincentive for innovation and
a burden on employment opportunities. 92
In addition, the Council's proposal is inconsistent with the goal of
reducing litigants' costs and judicial resources related to discovery
insofar as parties will be forced to engage in similar discovery re-
quests in subsequent cases involving the same product. The pri-
mary benefit of protective orders in product liability cases will inure
to the corporate defendant in those cases where the corporation
may avoid disclosing information already deemed to be helpful to
another consumer who was injured by the same product. For exam-
ple, it has been alleged that Dow Coming used protective orders to
keep information about defective silicone breast implants from pub-
lic scrutiny.93 The Council's proposal favoring protective orders
raises not only issues of public safety9 4 but also serious issues of
91. BNA Survey, supra note 86, at 40; see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (noting
allegations that protective orders serve only to seal useful information from other plaintiffs).
92. See, e.g., BNA Survey, supra note 86, at 42 (presenting arguments of California State
Senator Barry Keene in opposition to increased protective order restrictions).
93. See, e.g., Liza Kaufman, Critics Decry Bell's Hiringfor Implant Probe; Questions Raised About
Former Attorney General's Ties to Dow Corning, and His Investigations of Other Companies, RECORDER,
Feb. 28, 1992, at 5 (reporting one attorney's allegation that Dow Coming requested secrecy
orders prior to agreeing to release documents); Kennedy, supra note 89, at 53 (noting that
FDA panel was denied information because of secrecy orders and agreements stemming from
prior Dow breast implant litigation); Gina Kolata, Questions Raised on Ability of F.D.A. To Protect
Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at Al (noting that secrecy orders regarding documents pro-
duced in product liability litigation have frustrated FDA attempts to investigate safety of
Dow's breast implants and Upjohn's Halcion).
Conversely, a supporter of protective orders provides the following justification for his
position:
[I]t seems patently clear that, among a list of adverse effects, settlements would be
discouraged, all discovery would be necessarily resisted, and copycat lawsuits would
be filed if trade secrets and other confidential information were denied protection.
And from that it seems inescapably correct that the public would be harmed-that
people would be denied access to already congested courts and that consumers would
ultimately pay the increased costs of litigation.
BNA Survey, supra note 86, at 42 (statement of Barry Keene, California State Senator).
94. See, e.g., Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming lower court
decision not to issue protective order regarding accident and claims information in view of
fact that BIC "failed to show how it would suffer serious harm and embarrassment as a result
of the public disclosure of similar accidents or complaints"); Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868 F.2d
786, 792 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding use of protective order to be nonprejudicial despite claims of
harm stemming from inability to confer with other plaintiffs); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790-92 (1st Cir. 1988) (upholding modification of preexisting protective
order to give intervening public interest group access to previously protected discovery
materials), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989). See generally Lloyd Doggett & Michael J.
Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEx. L. REV.
643, 644-55 (1991) (supporting recently adopted Texas rule that encourages public accessi-
bility to civil court records); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Crisis, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 457, 467-87, 506 (arguing that public interest in obtaining confidential discovery doc-
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state and federal constitutional law.95
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DISCOVERY
A. Precursors to Modern Discovery
The discovery rules did not appear as a genie from a magic lamp.
The modem system of discovery was part of a procedural rules ref-
ormation that sought to free the system from the shackles of com-
mon law pleading. Common law pleading was prefigured and
technical, shaped by the twelfth-century system of writs and formal-
istic pleading requirements that originated in the King's Chancery
Court.96 Under the writ system, courts decided cases based on
meaningless formulas and distinctions rather than on the merits of
the cause of action.9 7 Noncompliance with rigid pleading require-
ments often resulted in the death of the action.9 8
uments is insufficient to justify implementation of doctrine of general public access); Arthur
R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427,
490-502 (1991) (opining that courts should carefully balance interests in confidentiality with
that of public access, and criticizing some states for adopting laws that presume public access);
Experts Offer Opinions on Secrecy in the Courts; Confidentiality Issues Roundtable, NAT'L LJ., July 30,
1990, at 15, 24-25 (surveying experts on issues surrounding administration of court secrecy
orders); Russ Herman, No More Dirty Little Secrets in the Courts, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1989, at
A31 (discussing recent decisions where sealed records containing information beneficial for
protection of public health were made publicly accessible); Paul Marcott, Keeping Secrets: Plain-
tiffs' Lawyers Claim Sealed Records Harm the Public, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 32, 32 (reporting on
mounting opposition to secrecy orders by various trial lawyers' advocacy groups); Amy D.
Marcus, Firms' Secrets Are Increasingly Bared by Courts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at B1 (noting
trend in many states of restricting issuance of protective orders that would seal court docu-
ments); Arthur R. Miller, Private Lives or Public Access?, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1991, at 65, 68 (recog-
nizing nationwide move calling for "presumption of public access" and arguing that such
change in direction is not needed because present system adequately serves confidentiality
interests as well as public access concerns).
95. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984) (finding protective
order limiting litigant's access to information in immediate trial as not violative of litigant's
First Amendment rights); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866, 914-15 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (determining that First Amendment did not require vacating of
protective order in antitrust case that sealed documents containing confidential commercial
information); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 11 (Tex. 1992) (finding gag order to be
unconstitutionally broad restraint on speech under Texas Constitution).
96. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HIs-
TORY 99 (1915).
97. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 195 (2d ed. 1968). Pollock and Maitland wrote about the writ
system of Henry III:
A "register of original writs" which comes from the end of that period will be much
longer than one that comes from the beginning. Apparently there were some writs
which could be had for nothing; for others a mark or a half-mark would be charged,
while, at least during Henry's early years, there were others which were only to be
had at high prices. We may find creditors promising the king a quarter or a third of
the debts that they hope to recover.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. Id. at 99. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "When I began [in 1864] the law
presented itself as a ragbag of details." OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 301
(1920).
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Thus, under common law procedure, the vast majority of preliti-
gation disputes focused on the phrasing of the pleadings, which set
forth the parties' causes of action and defenses. 99 Courts and liti-
gants focused on the technical niceties of pleading rather than on
the collection of information designed to elicit the truth. 100 One
commentator has noted that "[o]ne of the few blemishes that Black-
stone permitted himself to impute to the common-law system was its
lack of any means of discovery."''1 1
B. The Evolution of the Current Discovery Rules
Many of the disputes over writs and pleadings had as little rela-
tionship to a search for truth as the question of how many lawyers
could stand on the head of a pin. 10 2 In spite of the early common
law courts' overemphasis on the formalities of pleading, rules re-
garding discovery gradually evolved. l03 The common law courts
themselves began to recognize the need for making pertinent infor-
mation more accessible by allowing some primitive forms of discov-
ery, such as bills of particulars and devices to force production of
certain instruments when relied on in the opposing party's plead-
ing.' 0 4 Equity proceedings, on the other hand, developed substan-
99. See RODOLPHUS DICKINSON, A DIGEST OF THE COMMON LAW, THE STATUTE LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, AND OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS RELATIVE TO THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
219 (1818) (defining pleading in era before modem discovery as "the statement of the facts
which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action, or the defendant's ground of defence, in a
logical and legalform; it is the formal mode of alleging that on the record, which would be the
support or the defence of the party in evidence").
100. See id. at 222-24 (discussing necessary components comprising "methodical legal
form" of pleadings).
101. ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 201 (1952).
102. Under the common law, pleading became very technical because the system was
designed only for single-issue resolution. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,
914-16 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Perspective] (discussing evolution of pleading system into
19th century). As the system became more inflexible under numerous pleading rules, lawyers
were forced to analogize their causes of action to known writs and to utilize "fictions" or risk
losing on technical grounds. Id. at 917. These commonly used lawyering practices "made a
mockery of the common law's attempt to define, classify, and clarify." Id.
In 1890, Lord ChiefJustice Coleridge wrote of the need for reform of this procedural sys-
tem: "[In 1847] the Common Law rested mainly, though not exclusively, upon special plead-
ings, and truth was investigated by rules of evidence so carefully framed to exclude falsehood,
that very often truth was quite unable to force its way through the barriers erected against its
opposite." Lord Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, 37 CONTEMIP. REV. 797, 798
(1890).
103. See GEORGE RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 13-16 (1932) (presenting develop-
ment of discovery procedures in chancery and ecclesiastical courts in England).
104. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHIT'EN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 533 (1991); see EDSON R.
SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE 1-4 (2d ed. 1941)
(noting that motions for bills of particulars and independent actions for discovery through
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tially broader discovery mechanisms. 10 5  "Equity's discovery
devices-principally interrogatories, production and inspection of
documents, and depositions-served as the precursors of modem
discovery practice." 10 6
These devices, however, were quite limited and "did not permit a
party to discover what evidence the opposing party would use to
prove the opposing party's case at trial."' 1 7 The requirement that
discovery occur primarily in a separate proceeding in equity was
"cumbersome, slow, and expensive."' 08 In the late 1800s, these
problems led to proposed changes that eventually served the goals
of merging law and equity courts and permitting the use of limited
discovery in civil actions.109 Even state-level discovery reforms were
limited in comparison to the modem rules, however. For example,
oral depositions generally were limited to "certain categories of wit-
nesses related to the parties, such as their employees, as well as wit-
nesses who might be unavailable at trial." 110 Discovery was also
limited to "facts pertaining to the case of the party seeking discovery
and.., facts or documents that would be admissible in evidence at
trial."'
In federal court actions, availability of discovery followed patterns
similar to those that developed in the state courts, with federal stat-
utes and rules allowing some limited discovery in both law and eq-
uity. 12 As in the state system, however, the scope of discovery was
limited. 13 It was the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938,114 which provided for discovery in rules 26-37, that
bills of discovery were available for specified purposes, thus providing very primitive and im-
practical discovery tools).
105. See Subrin, Perspective, supra note 102, at 918-21 (discussing development in equity
proceedings of more liberal discovery procedures).
106. TEPLY & WHrrTEN, supra note 104, at 533.
107. TEPLY & WHrrEN, supra note 104, at 534-35.
108. TEPLY & WrITEN, supra note 104, at 535.
109. The most well-known example of state-level reform that was successful in combining
law with equity as well as providing more general rules was the New York Field Code of 1848.
See Subrin, Perspective, supra note 102, at 932-39 (discussing development of Field Code). The
significance of similar reforms has been described as follows: "The state reforms of the nine-
teenth century, in effect, substituted statutory means of obtaining depositions and discovery
for separate equity actions." TEPLY & WHrrr, supra note 104, at 536.
110. TEPLY & WHITrEN, supra note 104, at 536.
11. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 104, at 536.
112. See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 627
(1912) (adopting rules for courts of equity). These equity rules permitted limited discovery
by means of depositions and interrogatories. Id. at 661-62 (permitting taking of depositions
"in Exceptional Instances"). These rules also prescribed time limits on interrogatory
processes. Id at 665-66.
113. See TEPLY & WHrrrIEN, supra note 104, at 537-38 (noting that equity rules of 1912
served to streamline already cumbersome procedure rather than to broaden discovery base).
114. See Orders Re Rules of Procedure, 302 U.S. 783 (1937) (adopting rules of civil proce-
dure); see also 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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introduced the concept of broad discovery as we know it today. The
1938 federal discovery rules allowed a litigant to obtain information
from any party or witness without regard to whether the information
would be admissible at trial."15 As stated by the Supreme Court, the
new federal rules "restrict the pleadings to the task of general no-
tice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital
role in the preparation for trial."" l6
Over the next half century, almost all states adopted similar rules
regarding discovery.' 1 7 The purpose of the new rules on discovery
was to facilitate "an orderly search for the truth in the interest of
justice rather than a contest between two legal gladiators with sur-
prise and technicalities as their chief weapons."' 8 Since their origi-
nal adoption in 1938, the federal civil discovery rules have
undergone several revisions. 1 9 Amendments in 1970, 1980, and
§ 1004, at 28 (1987) (relating that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on Sep-
tember 16, 1938, after Congress adjourned without taking action regarding Supreme Court's
adoption of civil procedure rules).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes.
116. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). In 1946, the Advisory Committee
reviewing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure wrote about the amendment to rule 26(b):
[Discovery] may cover not only evidence for use at the trial but also inquiry into
matters in themselves inadmissible as evidence but which will lead to the discovery of
such evidence. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the
names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or
presentation of his [or her] case .... In such a preliminary inquiry admissibility at
trial should not be the test as to whether the information sought is within the scope
of proper examination. Such a standard unnecessarily curtails the utility of discovery
practice.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes (citations omitted).
117. See FRIEDENTHAL ETAL.,supra note 68, § 7.1, at 380 n.8 (1985) (noting that at least 37
states have adopted similar broad rules of discovery).
118. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 10 (1952). Other purposes for discovery are to create and preserve
information for use at trial; to determine which issues are actually in controversy; and to ob-
tain information that may lead a party to obtain evidence. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 68,
§ 7.1, at 380-81.
119. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 114, § 2002, at 21. In 1948, the rules were amended
to clarify certain ambiguities uncovered through practice and experience. Id. In 1963 and
1966, the rules were again amended, but only minor revisions were made. Id. Recognizing a
need for major changes in the rules, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules launched a com-
prehensive study in 1963. Id.
The Advisory Committee commissioned the Project for Effective Justice of' Columbia Law
School to conduct a field survey (Columbia Survey) of discovery practice. Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts Re-
lating to Depositions and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211, 220 (1967). The Columbia Survey found
no evidence to warrant a drastic change in the "philosophy" of the discovery rules. Id. at 220.
The costs of discovery were not deemed oppressive, and no major flaws were found in the
availability or scope of discovery. Id The Committee, relying largely on the Columbia Survey
findings, published a preliminary draft of proposed amendments in 1967. Id. at 217. See gener-
ally Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 481-84 (1968) (discussing
Columbia Survey's empirical data and noting Advisory Committee's receipt of findings prior
to drafting amendments). In 1969, after substantial revision, the Judicial Conference of the
United States recommended the amendments' adoption by the Supreme Court. Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487,
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1983 tended to increase the availability of information, 120 but at the
same time they attempted to curb abuses of discovery at the ex-
tremes, both in cases of abuse by overuse and avoidance. 12 1
Thus, since the adoption of the discovery rules in 1938, the trend
has been to encourage more disclosure prior to trial. 122 Presently,
parties to a civil action are entitled to all pertinent information from
any person unless such information is in some way privileged. 23
The evolution of the discovery rules reflects change and improve-
ment after demonstrated need.
Whatever merit the Council's recommendations relating to dis-
covery may have, no such radical change should be undertaken with-
out adequate empirical studies. The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990124 authorized the creation of pilot programs in the federal dis-
trict courts that will serve as laboratories for the generation and
study of data to determine what improvements, if any, are neces-
487-91 (1970). The Supreme Court adopted the amended rules in 1970. Order of March 30,
1970, 48 F.R.D. 459, 459 (1970). Further amendments in 1980 and 1983 were intended to
curb some of the perceived abuses of discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's
note (explaining that amendments were prompted partially by heavy criticism of discovery
abuse and use of discovery tools as "tactical weapons"). Further amendments of a technical
nature were made in 1987. Id.
In August 1991, the Judicial Conference of the United States published further proposed
amendments to the discovery rules and requested commentary from practitioners and the
general public. Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 56, 74-158 (1991); see Ferris, supra note 32, at 47-48 (presenting pros and cons of
proposed amendments to rule 26 and concluding that initial disclosure requirement is not
justified at this time). After comments and revisions, the Judicial Conference submitted the
proposed changes to the U.S. Supreme Court in November 1992. Letter from L. Ralph
Mechan, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to the ChiefJustice of
the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court I (Nov. 22, 1992) (on file
with The American Univeisity Law Review). As of the time of this Article's writing, these propos-
als were pending before the Supreme Court.
120. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 advisory committee's notes (illustrating increased
availability of information after 1970 revision of discovery rules). For example, the 1970
amendments to rule 26 provided for discovery of insurance policies as a matter of right, id.
26(b)(2) advisory committee's note, and eliminated the requirement of a showing of good
cause for the production of documents and things. Id. 34 advisory committee's note. Provi-
sions for the discovery of opinions of experts to be called to testify at trial were also added.
Id 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
121. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 advisory committee's notes (explaining that 1980
and 1983 revisions addressed misuse and abuse of discovery). For example, the 1980 amend-
ments provided for discovery conferences. Id. 26(f) advisory committee's note. The 1983
amendments added provisions that "attempt[ed] to address the problem of duplicative, re-
dundant, and excessive discovery." Id 26(a) advisory committee's note.
122. See generally 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 114, §§ 2001-2002, at 13-22 (discussing
purposes and evolution of federal discovery rules). The aims of discovery reflected in the
modem rules are generally said to be threefold: (1) to avoid surprise and possible miscar-
riage ofjustice; (2) to disclose fully the nature and scope of the controversy; and (3) to nar-
row, frame, and simplify the issues for trial. Id. § 2001, at 17-18.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
124. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 11 1990).
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sary.125 The Act requires each federal district to develop a civil jus-
tice expense and delay reduction plan, the purpose of which is "to
facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor
discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy,,
and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."' 26 These pilot pro-
grams have already begun, and some contain discovery provisions
that are similar to those recommended by the Council or the Judicial
Conference.1 27 The changes proposed by the Council and the Judi-
cial Conference should, at the very least, await the results of ongo-
ing examinations now occurring in the federal district courts.12 8 In
fact, some commentators have recommended that the Advisory
Committee delay consideration of principal recommendations until
after evaluation of the pilot programs.1 29 The Advisory Committee
thought it best not to postpone implementation because its recom-
mendations would permit federal districts "to depart from the na-
tional standards."'13 0
125. Id. § 471. See generally Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Refoim, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1521 (1993) (discussing results of federal district court pilot programs).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
127. For example, the District of Massachusetts, one of the "laboratory" districts,
amended its local rules, effective October 1, 1992, and adopted provisions similar to those
recommended by the Judicial Conference. U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., AMEND-
MENTS TO THE LOCAL RULES 1 (1992) (on file with The American University Law Review). With
respect to limitations on discovery events, Massachusetts limits each side to five depositions,
30 interrogatories, and two sets of requests for production without court order. D. MASS. R.
Civ. P. 26.1(C). The provisions for automatic disclosure are also similar to the Judicial Con-
ference proposal. See id. 26.2(A) (setting forth requirements for automatic document disclo-
sure and noting that disclosure is continuous and reciprocal obligation throughout case).
The Massachusetts example illustrates that the experimental procedures in the pilot dis-
tricts, together with their variations, can provide a basis for evaluating the Judicial Confer-
ence's proposals. See id. 26.5 (providing uniform set of definitions applicable to all discovery
requests, thus making comparison and evaluation even more feasible).
128. Subrin, Fireworks, supra note 26, at 47 (explaining that litigated cases should be re-
viewed on variety of bases because some procedures may be suitable for one type of case and
not another); Francis H. HareJr. & William Remine, Abuse of Discovery in Products Liability Cases,
in SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY INST., PERSONAL INJURY AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY SYMPOSIUM, § 4.02, 4-6 to -7 (1988) (commenting that cases involving discovery
abuse by "overuse" usually occur in commercial litigation); cf also Blue Chips Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (noting that potential for abuse of liberal dis-
covery rules may be more common in securities litigation than in other types of cases). Con-
gress itself has recognized the need to study the question of whether there ought to be
"systematic, differential treatment of civil cases that tailors the level of individualized and case
specific management" to specified criteria. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
129. Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Attachment B) 7 (May l, 1992) [herein-
after Letter] (on file with The American University Law Review).
130. Id. Chairman Pointer wrote in full:
Many critics also urged that early disclosure requirements not be adopted until after
the studies of the experience of courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act. To delay
consideration of rules changes until completion of those studies would effectively
postpone the effective date of any national standards until December 1998, a delay
the Advisory Committee believed unwise. However, the proposed rule is written in a
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History has demonstrated the necessity of examining empirical
data before embarking on radical revision of the discovery rules.
For example, prior to proposing changes in the discovery rules that
were adopted in 1970, the Advisory Committee itself noted the pre-
liminary need for "field studies" to examine the "values claimed for
discovery and abuses alleged to exist."1 3 1 After completion of an
empirical study entitled the Columbia Survey, 132 the Advisory Com-
mittee stated:
The Columbia Survey concludes, in general, that there is no em-
pirical evidence to warrant a fundamental change in the philoso-
phy of the discovery rules. No widespread or profound failings
are disclosed in the scope or availability of discovery. The costs of
manner that permits district courts during the period of experimentation to depart
from the national standards and determine whether and to what extent pre-discovery
disclosures should be required.
In addition, rule 26(b)(2) of the proposed rules enables the federal districts to alter the
provisions regarding the number of depositions and interrogatories and to limit the length of
depositions. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 79-80. Interestingly, the Advi-
sory Committee deleted earlier language proposing limitations on the time length of deposi-
tions, 1991 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 29, at 38-39 (proposed rule 30(d)), while
stating: "A majority of the Committee, however, concluded that any presumptive limit on the
length of depositions is a matter more properly left at this time for experimentation under the
Civil justice Reform Act, and the draft has been changed to effect this result." See Letter,
supranote 129, at 9.
It should be noted that the committee notes to the judicial Conference proposal regarding
initial disclosure indicate that "[t]he rule is based upon the experience of district courts that
have required disclosure of some of this information through local rules," as well as on expe-
rience of courts in Canada and the United Kingdom. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra
note 33, at 94-95 advisory committee's notes. The committee notes to proposed rule 33(a)
also state: "Experience in over half of the district courts has confirmed that limitations on the
number of interrogatories are useful and manageable." Id. at 141 advisory committee's notes.
The committee notes do not provide any citation, details, or analysis regarding these
"experiences."
131. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 489 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Proposed Amendments]. The proposal
stated:
Despite widespread acceptance of discovery as an essential part of litigation, disputes
have inevitably arisen concerning the values claimed for discovery and abuses al-
leged to exist. Many disputes about discovery relate to particular rule provisions or
court decisions and can be studied in traditional fashion with a view to specific
amendment. Since discovery is in large measure extrajudicial, however, even these
disputes may be enlightened by a study of discovery "in the field." And some of the
larger questions concerning discovery can be pursued only by a study of its operation
at the law office level and in unreported cases.
The Committee, therefore, invited the Project for Effective justice of Columbia
Law School to conduct a field survey of discovery. Funds were obtained from the
Ford Foundation and the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, Inc. The sur-
vey was carried on under the direction of Prof. Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia Law
School. The Project for Effective justice has submitted a report to the Committee
entitled "Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery" .....
Id.
132. COLUMBIA UNIV. PROJECT FOR EFFECTIVEJUSTICE, FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY, REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1968)
[hereinafter COLUMBIA SURVEY].
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discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter,
either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation.
Discovery frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise
be available to the parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or
settlement. On the other hand, no positive evidence is found that
discovery promotes settlement.' 3 3
Although the data involved in the Columbia Survey are stale and the
conclusions may or may not be correct today, the course adopted
prior to the 1970 amendments demonstrates the wisdom of "look-
ing" before "leaping."' 3 4
III. WINNERS AND LOSERS
A. What Is the Real Agenda Behind the Recommendations of the
President's Council on Competitiveness Relating to
Discovery?
The history of the discovery rules has shown that they were devel-
oped to improve outmoded practices and, as they evolved, contin-
ued to broaden the availability of information. 13 5 Simply put, the
rules allow parties to focus on the merits rather than on the techni-
cal niceties of pleadings. The discovery rules have reached their
current form after close scrutiny, deliberative discussion, trial and
error, and empirical studies. Thus far, the rules appear to have re-
sisted change based simply on "shoot-from-the-hip" proposals and
potentially misleading anecdotal examples.' 36
Both the Council's recommendations and former Vice President
Quayle's article are replete with assertions that are supported by lit-
tle valid empirical data.1 7 Granting one class of litigant an advan-
tage over another is not an adequate reason for credible change.
133. 1970 Proposed Amendments, supra note 131, at 489.
134. Cf New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("[A] page
of history is worth a volume of logic.").
135. See Subrin, Perspective, supra note 102, at 917 (commenting that rigidity of common
law system of technical pleading stimulated evolution of discovery rules to facilitate recovery
of information).
136. Professor Stephen Subrin has pointed out the desirability of maintaining the credi-
bility of the rulemaking process:
Since even projects that look into delay can have a "'political element,' Justice
(then reporter) Kaplan suggested that perhaps the soon-to-be-developed "Judicial
Center" might wish to do the study. "To involve the [Advisory] Committee in public
debates of that sort creates a possibility ofputting at risk the reputation for impartial-
ity and scientific skill which the rulemakers have been at pains to build up since the
1930's."
To quote Professor Rosenberg quoting the immortal Yogi Berra: 'It's deja vu all
over again.'
Subrin, Fireworks, supra note 26, at 47 (citations omitted).
137. See, e.g., supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (presenting costs cited by former
Vice President Quayle and critics' opinions of those numbers).
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The President's Council on Competitiveness makes reference to po-
tential product liability costs as a factor that has led U.S. manufac-
turers to withdraw products from the market and to discontinue
certain forms of product research.138 The Council also asserts that
the "current procedural system adds costs by prolonging resolution
of disputes and encouraging wasteful litigation."' 3 9 Under the topic
of "discovery," the Council further contends that "[o]ver 80 percent
of the time and cost of a typical lawsuit involves pretrial examination
of facts through discovery."1 40 The Council also refers to burden-
some discovery practices, including depositions, interrogatories,
and the "most onerous aspect of discovery, . . . the document de-
mand."14' In addition, the Council cites other perceived problems
with the litigation system that it claims add to the burden on Ameri-
can industry.' 42
The common thread running through the Council's proposals
and former Vice President Quayle's related article is an interest in
improving the lot of product manufacturers by reducing the adverse
impact of consumer litigation. To accomplish this purpose, they
seek to change the rules of discovery, the result of which is likely to
be less information available to plaintiffs who bear the burden of
proof. The formulation of changes that will be applicable to all civil
litigation in the federal courts with the goal of promoting the inter-
ests of a class of civil litigants-product manufacturers-and on the
basis of assertions unsupported by empirical data runs a real risk of
making the wrong change for the wrong reason. 143 These proposals
138. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 3.
139. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 3.
140. AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 3. William A. Glaser commented
on the Columbia Survey's results and concluded:
Discovery costs money, but the amount in the average case may be less than one
expects from the literature, which emphasizes problems of big cases....
Daily discovery costs are higher in commercial than in personal injury cases, and
particularly in patent and contract suits. Antitrust suits also have high total discovery
costs, but are spread over many lawyer-days of work.
Contrary to the fears of some observers, discovery has not become the principal
item of cost in litigation. In the average law suit, most time and money are devoted
to other work....
Complaints that the adversary created oppressive costs are not common, except in
the bigger commercial suits. They reflect higher than usual expenditures and thus
are not fictitious. Most arise from conflicts between bigger litigants and are not at-
tempts by the stronger side to bankrupt the smaller.
GLASER, supra note 37, at 185-87; see also infra note 143 (discussing results of Columbia Sur-
vey). Although these comments were made on the basis of data gathered during the 1960s,
they illustrate the potential gap between perception and reality.
141. AGENDA FOR CIVILJusTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 3.
142. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 4-6 (discussing high costs in-
volved with use of expert witnesses and junk science, and assessment of punitive damages).
143. Discovery was the subject of sustained empirical study in the early 1960s. See
GLASER, supra note 37, at 38-50 (evaluating need to determine impact of discovery through
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may very well benefit one class of litigant, but they also may harm
another class of litigant or present unknown risks to others.
use of empirical studies to accurately assess necessary amendments to procedural rules); Co-
LUMBIA SURVEY, supra note 132. The methods used by Columbia Survey researchers included
personal interviews and mailed questionnaires. COLUMBIA SURVEY, supra note 132, at 1-2;
Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 482-83 (1969).
The Columbia Survey concluded that the regime of liberal discovery worked. See GLASER,
supra note 37, at 83-87 (presenting statistics of gains from discovery). "In three-fourths of the
... cases the lawyers said that if they had not been able to avail themselves of discovery, they
would simply not have obtained the evidence uncovered." Rosenberg, supra, at 488.
In 198 1, researchers at Notre Dame Law School, with the assistance of the Federal Judicial
Center, completed a law-in-the-books analysis of federal litigation behavior that resulted in
the imposition of sanctions. See generally ROBERT E. RODES, JR. ET AL., SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE
FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (1981) (reporting survey that
studied imposition of sanctions for violations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through use
of case law, local rules, and secondary literature). The Notre Dame sanctions study was com-
pleted prior to the 1980 amendments to rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Id. The methodology employed was chiefly a content analysis of available case law. Id.
The researchers gathered all available citations from cases decided in the federal courts in-
volving rules 11, 16, 37, 41(b), and 55 through February 1, 1979. RODES, supra, at 1. The
researchers performed an intensive content analysis of district court cases in the 1978-1979
period in order to summarize current trends. Id. at 1-2. The Notre Dame study did not at-
tempt a statistical analysis ofjudicial behavior. Rather, the researchers focused on describing
patterns of litigation behavior as derived from the pages of judicial reports. Id. at 3. The
authors commented that the principal problem of discovery abuses was in enforcement. Id. at
85. The researchers concluded:
The typical pattern of sanctioning that emerges from the reported cases is one in
which the delay, obfuscation, contumacy, and lame excuses on the part of litigants
and their attorneys are tolerated until the court is provoked beyond endurance. At
that point the court punishes one side or the other with a swift and final termination
of the lawsuit by dismissal or default.
Id. Trial judges employed an "all or nothing" approach in applying discovery rules. Id.
Thus, the actual practice of discovery laws-in-action undermined the discovery laws-in-the-
books, which envisioned a "scheme of increasingly severe sanctions to maintain court con-
trol." Id. Consequently, the authors recommended greater use of financial penalties to aug-
ment discovery rules. Id. at 86.
A study conducted by Paul R. Connolly and others and commissioned by the Federal Judi-
cial Center in 1978 examined six federal courts and was limited in time and geographic area.
See PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL.,JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOV-
ERY 1, 85-90 (1978) (describing methodology of study). The study reached what many today
would characterize as a remarkable and surprising conclusion: in more than half of the cases
evaluated, no discovery was undertaken. Id. at 28-29. In the cases where discovery was con-
ducted, the discovery was extremely limited. Id. at 28-35. The study preceded the 1980
amendments to the discovery rules, however, and thus its usefulness is somewhat limited. See
Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals To Amend the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 193 (1992) (noting risk of relying on Connolly's data
because report was completed before 1980 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which were designed to curb discovery abuse).
Professor Wayne Brazil conducted extensive field research by interviewing litigators in the
Chicago area in 1980. See Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Obsenations by Chicago
Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 219 [hereinafter
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines] (discussing American Bar Foundation's pilot empirical study
of practicing attorneys' views, assessments, and complaints regarding civil discovery system);
see also Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and
Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 787, 790 (reporting lawyers' evaluation of present state of
discovery system and their views about relative severity of several major problems that burden
discovery process); Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of
Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875,
890-921, 937-55 (proposing comprehensive model rule that courts could use to manage pre-
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B. Broad Discovery Versus Narrow Discovery: Knowledge or Ignorance;
Who Benefits?
Supreme CourtJustice WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr. stated that the ma-
jor benefit achieved by discovery is " 'assuring that right and justice
shall have the most favorable opportunity of prevailing in cases that
are tried.' "144 A consumer litigant alleging injury from a defective
product and having the burden of proof needs information concern-
ing that product. Without that information, little can be accom-
plished. "'Modern products liability claims, toxic tort claims and
environmental litigation would be simply inconceivable without the
combination of liberal pleading, liberal joinder, and liberal discov-
ery. The total effect of this development has redounded to the ben-
efit of "have nots" relative to "haves."' '.145
A consumer claiming to have been injured by a defective product
requires much information that is commonly available only from the
defendant's own files. A few examples, among a myriad of others,
include field test reports, epidemiological studies, plans and specifi-
cations, prior incidents of consumer complaints, and intracompany
trial development of civil actions, proposing revisions to rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and suggesting sanctions that provide compensation for damages caused by oppo-
nent's violation of discovery obligations). Professor Brazil also found that discovery abuses
were more prevalent in complex litigation than in routine litigation. Brazil, Views from the Front
Lines, supra, at 223-35 (noting that discovery problems, such as inefficiency and delays due to
"intentional tactical jockeying" by counsel, occur more frequently in larger, more complex
cases). One commentator remarked that both the FederalJudicial Center study and the Chi-
cago-area study reveal that "lawyers behave badly when they think their clients stand to gain
from abusive behavior and when courts tacitly allow it." Dudley, supra, at 193 (citation omit-
ted).
In 1986, a study committee was charged by the Iowa Supreme Court to examine the effec-
tiveness of the discovery system in the Iowa District Court. See David S. Walker, Professionalism
and Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 759, 771 (1988-89) (noting Iowa
Supreme Court's appointment of special study committee to investigate discovery issues).
The study consisted of a random selection of 1400 routine civil cases, including tort, contract,
and property matters, although debt collection cases composed the largest number of cases.
Id. at 772-73. "[D]ebt-related claims constituted 40% of the random sample, nearly twice the
percentage of tort cases." Id. at 776. Further, in over 50% of the cases selected for examina-
tion in the study, the damages requested were $5000 or less. Id. at 782. The results of the
study revealed that "less than a quarter of the cases in the sample entailed the use of any
formal discovery devices; less than 5% entailed more than five separate discovery events, and
less than 3% involved more than nine." Id. at 781. Domestic relations cases were excluded
from these percentages. Id. Answers to questionnaires in connection with the Iowa study
showed that attorneys and judges agree that certain types of discovery abuses occur in "a real
minority of the civil cases in which discovery takes place." Id. at 783. Nevertheless, the au-
thor concluded that "[in the final analysis, the attorneys' and judges' responses estimating
percentages of cases in which certain problems occurred and their conclusions about how well
the 'current system of discovery' is working are inconclusive." Id. at 785.
144. ChiefJustice G. Joseph Tauro, Improving the Quality ofJustice in Massachusetts, 49 MAss.
L.Q. 7, 19 (1964) (quoting Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at The Round Table on
Administration of Justice, San Juan, Puerto Rico (Feb. 5, 1962)).
145. Subrin, Fireworks, supra note 26, at 6 (quoting Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Address at
the 50th Anniversary of Federal Rules Conference (Oct. 7-8, 1988)).
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memoranda relating to design issues. 146 One should not lose sight
of the real issue, however, which is not that information helps or
harms one side or the other, but rather that it be available to deter-
mine the truth. This objective is the very concept upon which the
modern rules are based. To tilt the rules in favor of one class of
litigant puts the entire system at risk. 147
Instances where information has proven to be successful to the
vindication of consumer rights abound. Some examples should il-
lustrate the point. In Cloroben Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 148 the de-
fendant resisted discovery of prior consumer complaints involving
its drain cleaner.' 49 Plaintiff, who was injured by t1he product,
claimed that because of the high sulfuric acid content, the drain
cleaner was unsuitable for home use.' 50 A discovery order resulted
146. See 2A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 88, § 17.02, at 17-20 (noting importance of
discovery in product liability claims). Frumer and Friedman state:
[T]he importance of discovery in a products liability case cannot be overemphasized.
Proper discovery may substantially aid a plaintiff in preparing and proving his [or
her] case against a defendant. Interrogatories may provide a history of the product
from conception to the date of injury thus aiding a plaintiff in determining those
parties in the chain of distribution, whether there was intermediate handling, and
perhaps pinpointing a defect. Various documents may also be helpful, especially
those relating to design of the product, the manufacturing process, quality control,
knowledge of and compliance with safety standards and certain aspects of the prod-
uct's history such as consideration of safety devices or alternate physical or chemical
composition.
Id. This section also contains a lengthy list of examples and citations involving the illustrative
uses of discovery by plaintiffs in product liability cases. Id. § 17.04, at 17-40 to -88.
147. Cf Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (stating that mutual knowledge of
relevant facts is necessary for proper litigation). The Supreme Court stated:
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition"
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his [or her] oppo-
nent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he [or she] has in his [or her] possession. The deposition-
discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be com-
pelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility
of surprise.
Id (citation omitted).
Nor is it suggested that the rules be designed to favor the plaintiff over the defendant. The
goal should be a system that is designed to achieve fairness and to reveal the truth. The
Supreme Court added in Hickman:
But framing the problem in terms of assisting individual plaintiffs in their suits
against corporate defendants is unsatisfactory. Discovery concededly may work to
the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of individual plaintiffs. Discovery, in
other words, is not a one-way proposition. It is available in all types of cases at the
behest of any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. Nor should the plaintiff be able to hide the truth without sanction.
To the extent such abuse occurs, it should be dealt with appropriately. See, e.g., Fox v. Stude-
baker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding dismissal of plain-
tiff's suit in connection with plaintiff's failure to disclose existence of information).
148. 464 A.2d 887 (Del. 1983).
149. Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 889-90 (Del. 19133).
150. Id at 891.
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in the disclosure of documents acknowledging consumer complaints
and proving the manufacturer's prior knowledge of the product's
danger.'l5  Similarly, in Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass,152 internal
documents demonstrated the manufacturer's longstanding aware-
ness of the health hazards of its asbestos product. 153 And in Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp.,' 54 an internal company memorandum showed
that the manufacturer was aware that lenient government standards
were not sufficient to ensure the safety of its highly flammable cot-
ton flannelette nightwear, but that the product was not changed be-
cause of economic concerns. 155
In Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter,'56 the Florida District Court of Ap-
peals found Piper liable for a plane crash caused when a door
opened in flight due to a faulty door latch. 157 Evidence revealed
during discovery showed that although the manufacturer's testing
had disclosed the problem, no action had been taken to remedy this
situation. 158 Also, in Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield,159 an internal re-
port suggested that implementation of safety measures involving
fuel system improvements should not be undertaken in deference to
profits.160 The defect caused a vehicle to become engulfed in flames
during a crash, resulting in the death of several passengers.' 6 1
The foregoing examples demonstrate how information enabled
the civil justice system to arrive at the truth. This result should be
no startling revelation. The President's Council on Competitive-
ness and former Vice President Quayle refer to the burdens and
abuses of discovery as reasons for changing the procedural rules. 162
151. Id. at 890-91.
152. 774 F. Supp. 929 (D.V.I. 1991).
153. Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929, 948-49 (D.V.I. 1991), aff'd in
part and vacated in part sub noma. Dunn v. Hovic, No. 91-3837, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 22749 (3d
Cir. Sept. 18, 1992), vacated, reh'gen banc granted, No. 91-3837, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25457
(3d Cir. Oct. 8, 1992); seeJohns-Manville Sales Corp. v.Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 249-51 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that defendant corporation suppressed scientific evidence, which
was later uncovered in discovery, of danger of its product).
154. 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
155. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 733-38 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
921 (1980).
156. 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
157. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
158. Id. at 1110. Similarly, in Airco v. Simmons First Nat'l Bank, 638 S.W.2d 660 (Ark.
1982), a field report in the manufacturer's files indicated the known risk that identical hoses
on an artificial breathing machine posed a danger of being confused in the operating room.
Id. at 661-63. During plaintiff's surgery, the wrong hose was connected, seriously injuring the
plaintiff. Id. at 661.
159. 319 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
160. Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E.2d 470, 474-78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
161. Id. at 474.
162. See AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2, at 3-4 (finding that 80% of time
and cost of typical lawsuit involves discovery); Quayle, supra note 1, at 563 (stating that discov-
ery procedures are often burdensome and result in increased expenses).
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Neither, however, discloses the extent to which some of those whom
they seek to assist have gone in attempts to prevent the release of
appropriate information requested through discovery. Some exam-
ples that the Council or Quayle may have "overlooked" follow for
purposes of illustration.
The case of Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 163 involved an action re-
sulting from the death of three persons in the crash of an airplane
manufactured by the defendant. 164 The plaintiffs alleged that vari-
ous design defects in the aircraft led to the crash. 165 The district
court judge found as follows with regard to the actions of the de-
fendant manufacturer:
I conclude that the defendant engaged in a practice of destroying
engineering documents with the intention of preventing them
from being produced in lawsuits. Furthermore, I find that this
practice continued after the commencement of this law suit and
that documents relevant to this law suit were intentionally de-
stroyed. I would note that I am not the first fact finder to con-
clude that Piper has intentionally destroyed documents.' 66
The court defaulted the defendant not only for the foregoing con-
duct but also for having disobeyed orders and having made misrep-
resentations to the court with regard to the existence of
documents.167
In Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,168 the plaintiff, a minor, was
severely burned when his pajamas caught on fire. 169 Plaintiff re-
quested, through discovery, records of prior complaints and com-
munications concerning other such instances involving nightwear
manufactured or marketed by the defendant. 170 The court ordered
the defendant to produce the information, but the defendant failed
to comply, claiming that it indexed claims alphabetically by the
name of the claimant rather than by type of product and thus could
not easily locate the pertinent records. 171 The court, in defaulting
the defendant, stated: "The defendant's failure to produce records
of similar complaints is due basically to an indexing system of its
163. 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
164. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 474 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
165. Id.
166. Id at 485-86 (citing Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983)).
167. Id. at 486. This portion of the district court decision was echoed in a related action.
Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440 (11 th Cir. 1985).
168. 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976).
169. Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 74 (D. Mass. 1976).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 75-77.
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own devising, so maintained as to obstruct full discovery."' 72
In Stanton v. IverJohnson's Arms, Inc.,173 the plaintiff claimed that
his injuries were caused by a defect in a firearm manufactured by the
defendant.' 74 The plaintiff sought certain information by way of in-
terrogatories and the defendant failed to supply the information,
although ordered to do so by the court. 175 The court sanctioned the
defendant by ordering that certain material facts be deemed admit-
ted, including the fact that the defect in the product proximately
caused plaintiff's injury.' 76 The court also noted that two consecu-
tive attorneys representing the manufacturer sought withdrawal
from the case due to lack of cooperation from the corporate
client. ' 77
The foregoing cases are noted by way of example only, but for a
point that should be obvious. Discovery procedures that aid in mak-
ing information available to litigants favor the truth, although that
truth may not be to the benefit of a particular litigant where the
"truth hurts."' 78 The President's Council on Competitiveness and
the former Vice President have set out an agenda to redesign an
entire procedural scheme, developed over more than a half century,
in order to benefit product manufacturers. If their recommenda-
tions are adopted, they will have accomplished their goal, but at
whose expense?
CONCLUSION
The President's Council on Competitiveness and former Vice
President Quayle have proposed sweeping changes to the discovery
172. Id. at 76; cf also Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 1988)
(noting that manufacturer's policy regarding record retention called for destruction of evi-
dence of product malfunctions); Craig v. A.H. Robins Co., 790 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (liti-
gating case involving deliberate destruction of documents); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738
P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1985) (stating that defendant commissioned studies that it later
dropped when they turned out to be unfavorable and "consigned hundreds of documents to
the furnace" instead of informing consumers of risks).
173. 88 F.R.D. 290 (D. Mont. 1980).
174. Stanton v. IverJohnson's Arms, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 290, 290 (D. Mont. 1980).
175. Id. at 290-91.
176. Id. at 292; cf. also Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1349 (5th Cir. 1978)
(discussing judgment for defendant that was reversed on appeal due to defendant's failure to
produce document during discovery). The defendant claimed that it was justified in not pro-
ducing the document because the plaintiff had asked for a "cost-benefit analysis" and that the
document in question was a "trend-cost analysis." Id. at 1341. The appellate court was not
impressed with the defendant's semantic gamesmanship. Id at 1341-42.
177. Stanton, 88 F.R.D. at 291. The court commented that both of the attorneys were
"exceptionally able attorneys. For both of them to seek to withdraw from the defense of this
action is a telling indication of defendant's uncooperative, contemptuous conduct." Id.
178. This rule should apply to all litigants, whether they are consumers, manufacturers, or
others. E.g., Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1975) (dis-
missing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to comply with discovery rules).
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provisions of the civil litigation system. We believe that the pro-
posed changes will limit the availability of information to injured
consumers in order to benefit manufacturers. The proponents of
the changes appear to have chosen one side over the other and have
attempted to structure new rules to benefit the favored side. Even if
the attempt to favor manufacturers over consumers could be consid-
ered a desirable goal, the proponents of change are obligated to
state their goals openly and present meaningful empirical studies
rather than assertions gathered from superficial data or biased
sources.
The changes proposed can in no way be considered minor tinker-
ing. Rather, their implementation has the potential to unravel much
of the civil justice system as it is presently structured. For the for-
mer Vice President to have stated, in support of the adoption of the
proposals, that they are neither "intended to affect substantive
rights" nor "designed to close the courthouse doors to any merito-
rious claim or... person," but rather are intended "to open those
doors" 79 is contrary to the evidence at hand and contrary to the
stated and unstated agenda of the proponents. Furthermore, the
discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
posed by the Judicial Conference should not be implemented until
the data to be gathered under the Civil Justice Reform Act are con-
sidered. If analysis of the data warrants the conclusion that the
amendment will improve the system and measure the refbrms' effect
on the substantive rights of all litigants, then, and only then, may
the amendments rightfully be adopted.
DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRING AFTER SUBMISSION OF THIS ARTICLE
Following submission of the final version of the manuscript for
this Article on March 12, 1993, the Supreme Court of the United
States acted on the amendments to the discovery rules proposed by
the Judicial Conference. On April 22, 1993, the Supreme Court or-
dered that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended, and in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2074, submitted the
amendments to Congress.1 8 0 The transmittal letter of the ChiefJus-
tice submitting the amendments to Congress contains the following
179. Quayle, supra note 1, at 560; supra note 8 (quoting full text of relevant portion of
article).
180. A copy of the order, the letter of transmittal to Congress, and the accompanying
statements are attached hereto as Appendix A. It should be noted that the amendments pro.
posed by the Judicial Conference and adopted by the Court include amendments relating not
only to the rules concerning discovery but also amendments to other rules. See 61 U.S.L.W.
4365 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993).
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statement: "While the Court is satisfied that the required proce-
dures have been observed, this transmittal does not necessarily indi-
cate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in
the form submitted."' 18 1
Three Justices issued a dissenting statement to the amendments
regarding discovery.18 2 The dissenting statement authored by Jus-
tice Scalia and joined by Justices Thomas and Souter focuses on the
provisions of the amendments imposing on litigants "a continuing
duty to disclose to opposing counsel, without awaiting any request,
various information 'relevant to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity.' "183 As reasons, the dissent refers to the likely increased bur-
dens on district court judges resulting from motion practice
regarding questions of compliance with the mandatory disclosure
provisions; questions raised about the attorney's duty owed to a cli-
ent versus the attorney's duty under the new rule to determine, for
the benefit of the other party, what is, or is not, subject to
mandatory disclosure; and the questioned wisdom of putting into
effect a "radical alteration" to the discovery rules without any prior
"significant testing on a local level."' 8 4
In his dissenting statement, Justice Scalia cites an article entitled
Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush To Reform and authored by
Griffin B. Bell, Chilton Davis Varner, and Hugh Q. Gottschalk. 185
Although dated "Fall 1992," this article in fact was not distributed
to the public until after April 1, 1993.186 This article, critical of the
mandatory disclosure provisions contained in the proposal of the
Judicial Conference, was supported through a grant from the Prod-
uct Liability Advisory Council Foundation. 187 The article cites wide-
181. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, ChiefJustice, The Supreme Court of the United
States, to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 1993),
reprinted in app. A, infra.
182. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas also dissented from amendments to rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4392-94 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993). Justice
White, in a separate statement, expressed reservations about the role of the Supreme Court in
the statutory process by which amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
adopted. Id. at 4390-92.
183. Id. at 4393.
184. Id. at 4393.
185. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovey--The Rush To Reform, 27 GA. L.
REV. 1 (1992).
186. However, "a first draft [of the article] was mailed to the Supreme Court on February
9, 1993 and a final draft on March 16, 1993." Letter from Michael M. Raeber, Editor-in-
Chief, Georgia Law Review, to Paul P. [sic], Sugarman, Dean, Suffolk University Law School
(Apr. 30, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review).
187. Bell, supra note 185, at 1. The Product Liability Advisory Council represents the
interests of manufacturers and other businesses in procedural and substantive issues related
to product liability litigation. Through the filing of amicus briefs and the funding of selected
topics and authors, it purports "to influence the rational development of the common law of
product liability." PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, FRIEND OF THE COURT IN PRODUCT
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spread opposition to the mandatory disclosure proposals cutting
across the lines between those who represent injured consumers
and those who represent the interests of manufacturers in product
liability cases.""'
Why the proponents of tort reform, who were allied with former
Vice President Quayle and the Council on Competitiveness, oppose
mandatory disclosure as proposed by the Judicial Conference is a
question worth pondering. One might speculate that the propo-
nents of tort reform may have been willing to embrace mandatory
disclosure coupled with all of the other modifications to the discov-
ery process as proposed by the Council on Competitiveness but not
willing to embrace the Judicial Conference proposal on disclosure
standing alone. The mandatory disclosure requirements may pres-
ent too much uncertainty as to how they would affect either con-
sumer interests or corporate interests and as such may unleash
forces that cannot be predicted. In addition, the problems
presented by the mandatory disclosure provisions probably raise the
worst fears for both sides: the consumer's fear that information will
not be disclosed and the manufacturer's fear that too much may
have to be disclosed. The radical and untested changes present a
justifiable fear for all litigants.
LIABILITY 4 (1990) (on file with The American University Law Review). It also purports "to pro-
vide an effective counterweight to the plaintiffs' bar and to attempt to bring balance and com-
mon sense to product liability law." Id. at 3. The Product Liability Advisory Council
Foundation and the Product Liability Advisory Council share the same address and telephone
number.
188. Bell, supra note 185, at 28-32 & nn.107-21.
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APPENDIX A*
$ZWrt* qvent of *Pt~±b Jtafr
C€" *or April 22, 1993
THE CHIF" JUSTICE
Dear Mr. Speaker:
By direction of the Supreme Court of the United
States, I have the honor to submit to the Congress
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
have been adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. While the
Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been
observed, this transmittal does not necessarily indicate
that the Court itself would have proposed these
amendments in the form submitted.
Justice White has issued a separate statement.
Justice Scalia has issued a dissenting statement, which
Justice Thomas joins and Justice Souter joins in part.
Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the
report of the Judicial Conference of the United States
containing the Advisory Committee Notes submitted to the
Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of
Title 28, United States Code.
Sincerely,
Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
* Excerpted from H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 1993
ORDERED:
1. That the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for -the
United States District Courts be, and they hereby are, amended by
including therein amendments to Civil Rules 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 15,
16, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 50, 52, 53, 54,
58, 71A, 72, 73, 74,. 75, and 76, and new Rule 4.1, and abrogation
of Form 18-A, and amendments to Forms 2, 33, 34, and 34A, and new
Forms 1A, lB, and 35.
[See infra., pp.
2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 1993, and shall
govern all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and,
insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases
then pending.
3. That THE CHIEF JUSTICE be, and he hereby is, authorized
to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DISCOVERY RULES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
[April 22, 1993]
Statement of JUSTICE WHITE. 28 U. S. C. §2072
empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the federal courts, including proceedings before
magistrates and courts of appeals. But the Court does
not itself draft and initially propose these rules. Section
2073 directs the Judicial Conference to prescribe the
procedures for proposing the rules mentioned in §2072.
The Conference is authorized to appoint committees to
propose such rules. These rules advisory committees are
to be made up of members of the professional bar and
trial and appellate judges. The Conference is also to
appoint a standing committee on rules of practice and
evidence to review the recommendations of the advisory
committees and to recommend to the Conference such
rules and amendments to those rules "as may be
necessary to maintain consistency and otherwise promote
the interest of justice." § 2073(b). Any rules approved by
the Conference are transmitted to the Supreme Court,
which in turn transmits any rules "prescribed" pursuant
to §2072 to the Congress. Except as provided in
§ 2074(b), such rules become effective at a specified time
unless Congress otherwise provides.
The members of the advisory and standing committees
are carefully named by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and I am
'Section 2075 vests a similar power in the Court with respect to rules
for the bankruptcy courts.
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quite sure that these experienced judges and lawyers take
their work very seriously. It is also quite evident that
neither the standing committee nor the Judicial
Conference merely rubber stamps the proposals
recommended to it. It is not at all rare that advisory
committee proposals are returned to the originating
committee for further study.
During my 31 years on the Court, the number of
advisory committees has grown as necessitated by
statutory changes. During that time, by my count at
least, on some 64 occasions we have "prescribed" and
transmitted to Congress a new set of rules or amendments
to certain rules. Some of the transmissions have been
minor, but many of them have been extensive. Over this
time, Justices Black and Douglas, either together or sepa-
rately, dissented 13 times on the ground that it was
inappropriate for the Court to pass on the merits of the
rules before it.2 Aside from those two Justices, Justices
Powell, Stewart and then-Justice REHNQUIST dissented on
one occasion and JUSTICE O'CONNOR on another as to the
substance of proposed rules. 446 U. S. 995, 997 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting); 461 U. S. 1117, 1119 (1983)
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). Only once in my memory did
the Court refuse to transmit some of the rule changes
proposed by the Judicial Conference. 500 U. S. -
(1991).
That the Justices have hardly ever refused to transmit
the rules submitted by the Judicial Conference and the
2 421 U. S. 1019, 1022 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 416 U. S. 1001,
1003 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 411 U. S. 989, 992 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); 409 U. S. 1132 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 406 U. S.
979, 981 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 401 U. S. 1017, 1019 (1971)
(Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); 400 U. S. 1029, 1031 (1971) (Black,
J., with whom Douglas, J., joins, dissenting); 398 U. S. 977, 979 (1970)
(Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); 395 U. S. 989, 990 (1969) (Black, J.,
not voting); 383 U. S. 1087, 1089 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); ibid.
(Douglas, J., dissenting); 383 U. S. 1029, 1032 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting); 374 U. S. 861, 865 (1963) (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting).
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fact that, aside from Justices Black and Douglas, it has
been quite rare for any Justice to dissent from
transmitting any such rule, suggest that a sizable majority
of the 21 Justices who sat during this period concluded
that Congress intended them to have a rather limited role
in the rulemaking process. The vast majority (including
myself) obviously have not explicitly subscribed to the
Black-Douglas view that many of the rules proposed dealt
with substantive matters that the Constitution reserved
to Congress and that in any event were prohibited by
§ 2072's injunction against abridging, enlarging or
modifying substantive rights.
Some of us, however, have silently shared Justice
Black's and Justice Douglas' suggestion that the enabling
statutes be amended
"to place the responsibility upon the Judicial Con-
ference rather than upon this Court. Since the stat-
ute was first enacted in 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, the
Judicial Conference has been enlarged and improved
and is now very active in its surveillance of the work
of the federal courts and in recommending appropriate
legislation to Congress. The present rules produced
under 28 U. S. C. § 2072 are not prepared by us but
by Committees of the Judicial Conference designated
by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and before coming to us they
are approved by the Judicial Conference pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §331. The Committees and the
Conference are composed of able and distinguished
members and they render a high public service. It
is they, however, who do the work, not we, and the
rules have only our imprimatur. The only
contribution that we actually make is an occasional
exercise of a veto power. If the rule-making for
Federal District Courts is to continue under the
present plan, we believe that the Supreme Court
should not have any part in the task; rather, the
statute should be amended to substitute the Judicial
Conference. The Judicial Conference can participate
1993] 1509
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more actively in fashioning the rules and affinmatively
contribute to their content and design better than we
can. Transfer of the function to the Judicial Confer-
ence would relieve us of the embarrassment of having
to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of rules
which we have approved and which as applied in
given situations might have to be declared invalid."
374 U. S. 865, 869-870 (1963) (footnote omitted).
Despite the repeated protestations of both or one of
those Justices, Congress did not eliminate our
participation in the rulemaking process. Indeed, our
statutory role was continued as the coverage of § 2072 was
extended to the rules of evidence and to proceedings
before magistrates. Congress clearly continued to direct
us to "prescribe" specified rules. But most of us concluded
that for at least two reasons Congress could not have
intended us to provide another layer of review equivalent
to that of the standing committee and the Judicial
Conference. First, to perform such a function would take
an inordinate amount of time, the expenditure of which
would be inconsistent with the demands of a growing
caseload. Second, some us, and I remain of this view,
were quite sure that the Judicial Conference and its
committees, "being in large part judges of the lower courts
and attorneys who are using the Rules day in and day
out, are in a far better position to make a practical
judgment upon their utility or inutility than we." 383
U. S. 1089, 1090 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
I did my share of litigating when in practice and once
served on the Advisory Committee for the Civil Rules, but
the trial practice is a dynamic profession, and the longer
one is away from it the less likely it is that he or she
should presume to second-guess the careful work of the
active professionals manning the rulemaking committees,
work that the Judicial Conference has approved. At the
very least, we should not perform a de novo review and
should defer to the Judicial Conference and its committees
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as long as they have some rational basis for their
proposed amendments.
Hence, as I have seen the Court's role over the years,
it is to transmit the Judicial Conference's rec-
ommendations without change and without careful study,
as long as there is no suggestion that the committee
system has not operated with integrity. If it has not,
such a fact, or even such a claim, about a body so open
to public inspection would inevitably surface. This has
been my practice, even though on several occasions, based
perhaps on out-of-date conceptions, I had serious questions
about the wisdom of particular proposals to amend certain
rules.
In connection with the proposed rule changes now before
us, there is no suggestion that the rulemaking process has
failed to function properly. No doubt the proposed
changes do not please everyone, as letters I have received
indicate. But I assume that such opposing views have
been before the committees and have been rejected on the
merits. That is enough for me.
Justice Douglas thought that the Court should be taken
out of the rulemaking process entirely, but as long as
Congress insisted on our "prescribing" rules, he refused
to be a mere conduit and would dissent to forwarding rule
changes with which he disagreed. I note that JUSTICE
SCALIA seems to follow that example. But I also note that
as time went on, Justice Douglas confessed to insufficient
familiarity with the context in which new rules would
operate to pass judgment on their merits.'
'In dissenting from the order transmitting the Chapter XIII
Bankruptcy Rules, Justice Douglas, among other things said: "Forty years
ago I had perhaps some expertise in the field; and I know enough about
history, our Constitution, and our decisions to oppose the adoption of Rule
920. But for most of these Rules I do not have sufficient insight and
experience to know whether the are desirable or undesirable. I must,
therefore, disassociate myself from them." 411 U. S. 992, 994 (1973).
With respect to Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure
forwarded by the Court a year later, the following statement was
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In conclusion, I suggest that it would be a mistake for
the bench, the bar, or the Congress to assume that we are
duplicating the function performed by the standing
committee or the Judicial Conference with respect to
changes in the various rules which come to us for
transmittal. As I have said, over the years our role has
been a much more limited one.
appended to the Court's order, 416 U. S. 1003 (1974): "MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS is opposed to the Court's being a mere conduit of Rules to
Congress since the Court has had no hand in drafting them and has no
competence to design them in keeping with the titles and spirit of the
Constitution."
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
[April 22, 1993]
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, and
with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins as to Part II, filed a
dissenting statement.
I dissent from the Court's adoption of the amendments
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 (relating to sanc-
tions for frivolous litigation), and 26, 30, 31, 33, and 37
(relating to discovery). In my view, the sanctions proposal
will eliminate a significant and necessary deterrent to
frivolous litigation; and the discovery proposal will in-
crease litigation costs, burden the district courts, and,
perhaps worst of all, introduce into the trial process an
element that is contrary to the nature of our adversary
system.
I
Rule 11
It is undeniably important to the Rules' goal of "the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1, that frivolous pleadings
and motions be deterred. The current Rule 11 achieves
that objective by requiring sanctions when its standards
are violated (though leaving the court broad discretion as
to the manner of sanction), and by allowing compensation
for the moving party's expenses and attorney's fees. The
proposed revision would render the Rule toothless, by
allowing judges to dispense with sanction, by disfavoring
compensation for litigation expenses, and by providing a
21-day "safe harbor" within which, if the party accused
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of a frivolous filing withdraws the filing, he is entitled to
escape with no sanction at all.
To take the last first: In my view, those who file
frivolous suits and pleadings should have no "safe harbor."
The Rules should be solicitous of the abused (the courts
and the opposing party), and not of the abuser. Under
the revised Rule, parties will be able to file thoughtless,
reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure in the knowledge
that they have nothing to lose: If objection is raised, they
can retreat without penalty. The proposed revision
contradicts what this Court said only three years ago:
"Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion,
burdening courts and individuals alike with needless
expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant quickly
dismisses the action, the harm triggering Rule l1's
concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a litigant who
violates Rule 11 merits sanctions even after a dismissal."
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 398
(1990). The advisory committee itself was formerly of the
same view. Ibid. (quoting Letter from Chairman, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules).
The proposed Rule also decreases both the likelihood
and the severity of punishment for those foolish enough
not to seek refuge in the safe harbor after an objection is
raised. Proposed subsection (c) makes the issuance of any
sanction discretionary, whereas currently it is required.
Judges, like other human beings, do not like imposing
punishment when their duty does not require it, especially
upon their own acquaintances and members of their own
profession. They do not immediately see, moreover, the
system-wide benefits of serious Rule 11 sanctions, though
they are intensely aware of the amount of their own time
it would take to consider and apply sanctions in the case
before them. For these reasons, I think it important to
the effectiveness of the scheme that the sanctions remain
mandatory.
Finally, the likelihood that frivolousness will even be
challenged is diminished by the proposed Rule, which
restricts the award of compensation to "unusual circum-
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stances," with monetary sanctions "ordinarily" to be
payable to the court. Advisory Committee Notes to
Proposed Rule 11, pp. 53-54. Under Proposed Rule
11(c)(2), a court may order payment for "some or all of the
reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as
a direct result of the violation" only when that is "war-
ranted for effective deterrence." Since the deterrent effect
of a fine is rarely increased by altering the identity of the
payee, it takes imagination to conceive of instances in
which this provision will ever apply. And the commentary
makes it clear that even when compensation is granted
it should be granted stingily-only for costs "directly and
unavoidably caused by the violation." Id., at 54. As seen
from the viewpoint of the victim of an abusive litigator,
these revisions convert Rule 11 from a means of obtaining
compensation to an invitation to throw good money after
bad. The net effect is to decrease the incentive on the
part of the person best situated to alert the court to
perversion of our civil justice system.
I would not have registered this dissent if there were
convincing indication that the current Rule 11 regime is
ineffective, or encourages excessive satellite litigation. But
there appears to be general agreement, reflected in a
recent report of the advisory committee itself, that Rule
11, as written, basically works. According to that report,
a Federal Judicial Center survey showed that 80% of
district judges believe Rule 11 has had an overall positive
effect and should be retained in its present form, 95%
believed the Rule had not impeded development of the
law, and about 75% said the benefits justify the expendi-
ture of judicial time. See Interim Report on Rule 11,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, reprinted in G. Vairo,
Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventive
Measures, App. 1-8-1-10 (2d ed. 1991). True, many
lawyers do not like Rule 11. It may cause them financial
liability, it may damage their professional reputation in
front of important clients, and the cost-of-litigation savings
it produces are savings not to lawyers but to litigants.
But the overwhelming approval of the Rule by the federal
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district judges who daily grapple with the problem of
litigation abuse is enough to persuade me that it should
not be gutted as the proposed revision suggests.'
II
Discovery Rules
The proposed radical reforms to the discovery process
are potentially disastrous and certainly premature-partic-
ularly the imposition on litigants of a continuing duty to
disclose to opposing counsel, without awaiting any request,
various information "relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity." See Proposed Rule 26(a)(1)(A),
(a)(1XB), (eXi). This proposal is promoted as a means of
reducing the unnecessary expense and delay that occur in
the present discovery regime. But the duty-to-disclose
regime does not replace the current, much-criticized
discovery process; rather, it adds a further layer of discov-
ery. It will likely increase the discovery burdens on
district judges, as parties litigate about what is "relevant"
to "disputed facts," whether those facts have been alleged
with sufficient particularity, whether the opposing side has
adequately disclosed the required information, and wheth-
er it has fulfilled its continuing obligation to supplement
the initial disclosure. Documents will be produced that
turn out to be irrelevant to the litigation, because of the
early inception of the duty to disclose and the severe
penalties on a party who fails to disgorge in a manner
consistent with the duty. See Proposed Rule 37(c) (prohib-
'I do not disagree with the proposal to make law firms liable for an
attorney's misconduct under the Rule, see Proposed Rule 11(c), or with
the proposal that Rule 11 sanctions be applied when claims in pleadings
that at one time were not in violation of the rule are pursued after it is
evident that they lack support, see Proposed Rule 11(b); Advisory
Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 11, p. 51.
It is curious that the proposed rule regarding sanctions for discovery
abuses requires sanctions, and specifically recommends financial sanctions
and compensation to the moving party. See Proposed Rule 37(a)(4)(A),
(c)(1). No explanation for the inconsistency is given.
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iting, in some circumstances, use of witnesses or informa-
tion not voluntarily disclosed pursuant to the disclosure
duty, and authorizing divulgement to the jury of the
failure to disclose).
The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably
within the American judicial system, which relies on
adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a neutral
decisionmaker. By placing upon lawyers the obligation to
disclose information damaging to their clients-on their
own initiative, and in a context where the lines between
what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed
are not clear but require the exercise of considerable
judgment-the new Rule would place intolerable strain
upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and
not to assist the opposing side. Requiring a lawyer to
make a judgment as to what information is "relevant to
disputed facts" plainly requires him to use his professional
skills in the service of the adversary. See Advisory
Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 26, p. 96.
It seems to me most imprudent to embrace such a
radical alteration that has not, as the advisory committee
notes, see id., at 94, been subjected to any significant
testing on a local level. Two early proponents of the duty-
to-disclose regime (both of whom had substantial roles in
the development of the proposed rule-one as Director of
the Federal Judicial Center and one as a member of the
advisory committee) at one time noted the need for such
study prior to adoption of a national rule. Schwarzer, The
Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery
Reform, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 703, 723 (1989); Brazil, The
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1295, 1361 (1978).
More importantly, Congress itself reached the same
conclusion that local experiments to reduce discovery costs
and abuse are essential before major revision, and in the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, §§ 104,
105, 104 Stat. 5097-5098, mandated an extensive pilot
program for district courts. See also 28 U. S. C. §§471,
473(a)(2)(C). Under that legislation, short-term experi-
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ments relating to discovery and case management are to
last at least three years, and the Judicial Conference is
to report the results of these experiments to Congress,
along with recommendations, by the end of 1995. Pub.
L. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5097-5098. Apparently, the
advisory committee considered this timetable schedule too
prolonged, see Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule
26, p. 95, preferring instead to subject the entire federal
judicial system at once to an extreme, costly, and essen-
tially untested revision of a major component of civil
litigation. That seems to me unwise. Any major reform
of the discovery rules should await completion of the pilot
programs authorized by Congress, especially since courts
already have substantial discretion to control discovery.'
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26.
I am also concerned that this revision has been recom-
mended in the face of nearly universal criticism from
every conceivable sector of our judicial system, including
judges, practitioners, litigants, academics, public interest
groups, and national, state and local bar and professional
associations. See generally Bell, Varner, & Gottschalk,
Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform,
27 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 28-32, and nn. 107-121 (1992). Indeed,
after the proposed rule in essentially its present form was
published to comply with the notice-and-comment require-
ment of 28 U. S. C. §2071(b), public criticism was so
severe that the advisory committee announced abandon-
ment of its duty-to-disclose regime (in favor of limited
pilot experiments), but then, without further public
comment or explanation, decided six weeks later to
recommend the rule. 27 Ga. L. Rev., at 35.
Constant reform of the federal rules to correct emerging
2 For the same reason, the proposed presumptive limits on depositions
and interrogatories, see Proposed Rules 30, 31, and 33, should not be
implemented.
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problems is essential. JUSTICE WHITE observes that
Justice Douglas, who in earlier years on the Court had
been wont to note his disagreements with proposed
changes, generally abstained from doing so later on,
acknowledging that his expertise had grown stale. Ante,
at 5. Never having specialized in trial practice, I began
at the level of expertise (and of acquiescence in others'
proposals) with which Justice Douglas ended. Both
categories of revision on which I remark today, however,
seem to me not matters of expert detail, but rise to the
level of principle and purpose that even Justice Douglas
in his later years continued to address. It takes no expert
to know that a measure which eliminates rather than
strengthens a deterrent to frivolous litigation is not what
the times demand; and that a breathtakingly novel
revision of discovery practice should not be adopted
nationwide without a trial run.
In the respects described, I dissent from the Court's
order.
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